The World Through Your Eyes: An Analysis of Spike Jonze\u27s Her by Snyder, Thatcher Kupple
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Fall 2015 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Fall 2015 
The World Through Your Eyes: An Analysis of Spike Jonze's Her 
Thatcher Kupple Snyder 
Bard College, ts4491@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_f2015 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Epistemology Commons, Feminist Philosophy 
Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, Reading and Language Commons, and the Visual Studies 
Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Snyder, Thatcher Kupple, "The World Through Your Eyes: An Analysis of Spike Jonze's Her" (2015). Senior 
Projects Fall 2015. 28. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_f2015/28 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
The World Through Your Eyes: On Spike Jonze’s 
Her  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior Project submitted to 
 
The Division of Social Studies 
 
Of Bard College 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Thatcher Snyder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
 
November 2015 
 
 
 
  
  
  
Acknowledgments 
 
Two years ago, when I began the research that would eventually become this thesis, 
I was living alone in Tivoli, NY, in a dilapidated house, recently dumped. My friends 
were scattered across the country, occupied with the preprofessional mechanics of a 
collegiate summer, and my relatives were either away at camp, or grappling with 
their own romantic catastrophes, so I spent much of my time haunting Tivoli’s 
streets, talking to no one, and reading philosophy.  
 One friend, however, had remained at school with me. He had a job as part of 
the sound crew for Bard’s summer classical music festival. It was with him that I 
watched Her for the second time, and the idea for this project was born. Thank you, 
Paul. 
 I also could not have made it through that summer without the invaluable 
help of Professor Jay Elliot, who was always willing to speak with me about the 
minutiae of my project, and who lent me a few books that form the nucleus of the 
project’s third chapter.  
 Further, I would like to thank Kevin Soto, Fraiser Kansteiner, Grace Caiazza, 
Emily Lyon, Abby Adler, Chloe Chappe, Collin Leitch, Kellan Rohde, Antonio Ferraz, 
Nora Knight, Will Kettner, Patrick King, Nicole Marin, Hannah Smith, Eli Segal, 
Bethany Nolgren, Daniel Berthold, Rick Ross, and many more, for the conversations 
that we have had regarding love, marriage, divorce, friendship, sex, knowledge, 
intimacy, and commitment. Your input has been an immense help, and the quality of 
the project would have been much less without your contributions. Thank you for 
putting up with my obsession. I know I have somewhat worn you out on the topic.  
 I would also like to thank my parents, without whom this project would have 
never happened. Somewhere there deserves to be a statue erected of my mother, 
holding a pen, admonishing me for clunky syntax. You are the two best people I 
know. Keep it up. 
 Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Norton Batkin, my advisor, 
who guided me through this rough process with the skill of a ship’s captain, reading 
the tides. How does it feel to be mentioned in the acknowledgments of a work other 
than Cavell’s? Your comments were instrumental in shaping this project, and your 
friendship was the motor by which it became complete. I would also like to note that 
you have the most beautiful handwriting that I have ever seen, and my pages will 
miss its presence immensely. Thank you for teaching me the choice of philosophy, 
and the calm it can bring. 
  
  
  
  
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction: The Fantasy of Love — pp. 1-9 
A difficulty of philosophy; Ordinary Language Philosophy; H.P. Grice; 
Wittgenstein and Cavell; Descartes and human knowledge; The 
rejection of the human; Acknowledgment; A distance from the world; 
Her as film and philosophy 
 
 
Chapter One: Words — pp. 10-30 
The first letter; Theodore’s cynicism; Skepticism and knowledge claims; 
Possibility and Despair; Samantha’s quality of consciousness; Intuition; 
The blind date; Loneliness and fantasy; In bed with Samantha; 
Emersonian Perfectionism; Acts of friendship 
 
 
Chapter Two: Bodies — pp. 31-55 
Samantha’s realness; Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?; A 
scene of instruction; The teacher and the poet; People watching; Sex and 
placement; At the beach; Meeting Catharine; The surrogate 
 
 
Chapter Three: Fantasies — pp. 56-87 
Aftermath; The sigh; Clarity and confidence; Reconciliation; The dangers 
of fantasy; Courage and accuracy; Transcending the body; Alan Watts; A 
declaration of love; Love’s insanity; Fantasy and insistence; The 
problems of belief; Claims of ownership; The spaces between words; 
The final letter; A return to the ordinary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accidents of Birth 
 
Spared by a car or airplane crash or 
cured of malignancy, people look 
around with new eyes at a newly 
praiseworthy world, blinking eyes like these. 
 
For I’ve been brought back again from the 
fine silt, the mud where our atoms lie 
down for long naps. And I’ve also been 
pardoned miraculously for years 
by the lava of chance which runs down 
the world’s gullies, silting us back. 
Here I am, brought back, set up, not yet 
happened away. 
 
But it’s not this random 
life only, throwing its sensual 
astonishments upside down on 
the bloody membranes behind my eyeballs, 
not just me being here again, old 
needer, looking for someone to need, 
but you, up from the clay yourself, 
as luck would have it, and inching 
over the same little segment of earth- 
ball, in the same little eon, to 
meet in a room, alive in our skins, 
and the whole galaxy gaping there 
and the centuries whining like gnats— 
you, to teach me to see it, to see 
it with you, and to offer somebody 
uncomprehending, impudent thanks. 
 
—William Meredith 
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Introduction: The Fantasy of Love 
 
A difficulty of philosophy has always been its seeming disinterest in the state 
of the world, which is to say the state of my world, the state of me. I acknowledge 
the sense of narrow solipsism here, perhaps having to do with my youth, or my lack 
of experience in the world, such that I actively need to be more interested in my life, 
currently, than disinterested, for the sake of growth. But, I should also like to say 
that part of my discomfort with the endeavor of contemporary philosophy is its 
active ignoring of the state of persons—its lack of engagement with personal 
comcepts, by superseding such concerns with questions of epistemology, 
metaphysics, logic, ethics, etc., which do, of course, affect persons, and are in certain 
ways explicative of certain realities, but which, in my view, often bypass what is 
truly important, the core of things (me as both me and as the concept “me”), by 
focusing on structures and valuations and theories of a testable and verifiable sort. 
Contemporary analytic philosophy has no way to account for concepts such as, 
“conversation,” “humanness,” “comfort,” “acknowledgment,” “love,” “hate,” 
“friendship,” “partnership,” “marriage,” “divorce,” “education,” “jealousy,” “envy,” 
“potential,” etc., that I find to be personally important to my lived experience. 
Further, I think philosophy has a duty to be receptive to one’s lived experience, as it 
has, without a doubt, the ability to respond to this calling—that is, the call of many, 
if not all, people who look for a clarifying of the fact of life, by means of an honest 
(though not necessarily true) assessment of the fact of it’s being lived, and the 
method by which it is lived.  
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There are philosophers who have taken steps down this path, many of whom 
would be roughly classified as Ordinary Language Philosophers, which is to say that 
they take in the language of the everyday a philosophical significance that has 
otherwise been unaccounted for, or unacknowledged. Philosophers such as J. L. 
Austin, Gilbert Ryle, H. P. Grice, Peter Strawson, H. L. A. Heart, John Searle, John 
Wisdom, etc., worked in the mid 20th Century to establish a philosophical grounding 
through ordinary language by taking a diagnostic approach to the everyday use of 
words, attempting to address their uses as specifically as possible, grounding them 
in a specific context. (In this sense, though perhaps only this sense, one may 
consider them as being actively hostile of metaphysics.) 
Grice in particular, in his essay “Meaning,” and its successor, “Utterer’s 
Meaning and Intentions,” constructed a theory of meaning based on implicature 
(that is, something suggested by a sentence, but not strictly implied) that to my 
mind was a quite valiant attempt to put the human back into the content of 
expression, and back into expression itself. For Grice, who worked within a sub-field 
of Semiotics and Linguistics (that is, the study of sign, thus word, meaning) called 
Pragmatics, which studied how context (speaker, location, etc.) affects word 
meaning, the goal of “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” was to show, and in some 
sense systematize, the actual messiness and complexity of human communication, 
which is not reducible without sacrificing a certain amount of the expression’s 
semantic content.  
A guiding claim of Ordinary Language Philosophy is the following: We 
already have everything we need. It is right in front of us. We just need to see it. 
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Philosophy’s habit to move past the everyday is just that, a habit. It does not need to 
“live above the world” in any sense. But, it does need to change. 
I began my investigation into Her by taking lead from two philosophers, both 
of whom may be uncomfortably situated in the tradition of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. Both of these philosophers 
(one of whom has drawn much influence from the other) begin their inquiry into 
meaning, word-use, morality, education, and knowledge in the everyday use of 
language, and, as such, might be classified as Ordinary Language Philosophers. The 
aim of their inquiry, however, is not critique of the Atomist philosophy of Bertrand 
Russell and G. E. Moore, as it is in Grice and Austin. What Cavell and Wittgenstein 
wish to gain from philosophy (what they think philosophy can do, or where it 
arises) is not clarity of word-meaning, or a diagnostic understanding of word use, 
but rather a therapeutic analysis and pacification of the human desire for 
knowledge, and the intellectual habit that forms knowledge’s quest. For Cavell and 
Wittgenstein, philosophy is not concerned with concepts (of knowledge, certainty, 
morality, etc.) but with the manner and form in which these concepts arise—i.e., 
what makes them efficacious, or seemingly necessary. They hold this project in 
tandem with Nietzsche, and Thoreau, and Emerson, and (sometimes) Heidegger—
others who take philosophy’s aim to (often) be an examination and critique of the 
way in which one’s life progresses. 
Specifically, Cavell and Wittgenstein address the conception of human 
knowledge put forth by Rene Descartes, a conception which features heavily in the 
philosophical positions of Rationalism and Skepticism. Descartes’ method of 
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questioning his own fundamental assumptions about the world in an attempt to 
establish what knowledge was “certain” (i.e., unable to not be known), and separate 
it from other, weaker forms of knowledge (experiential, inferential, etc.), 
demonstrated to him that all knowledge of the world, or of things outside our mind, 
could not be known with the certainty that he required. This line of questioning 
implies that no claim of knowledge of the world can be considered final, or 
definitive, with regard to any question that takes the world, or anything in the 
world, as its object. Descartes argues that the mind is full of errors, and that worldly 
knowledge itself consists of judgments made by the mind (Meditations, 68). He 
justifies this using an example of a piece of wax, which has it properties changed 
when it melts in high heat. The mind knows that the melted wax is still wax, because 
it has rationally judged the wax to be so, but nothing empirically sensible links the 
wax with its melted form, as the melted form has different properties than the solid. 
Descartes follows up his example, ”were I perchance to look out my window and 
observe men crossing the square, I would ordinarily say I see the men themselves 
just as I say I see the wax. But what do I see aside from hats and clothes, which could 
conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be men.” Thus, we are persuaded by 
Descartes that knowledge of the world, and of other people, takes the form of 
judgments of the mind about the world. 
Cavell and Wittgenstein argue that Descartes’ position implies a separation of 
the human subject from his environment—a separation of his internal states from 
external reality—and that the Rationalist position is that the mind acts upon the 
world (in judgment), but is not determined (or influenced) by it, in the same way 
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that, say, a ruler can act upon a length of wood (by measuring it), but that its 
purpose, or utility, is not determined by that wood. Cavell in particular maintains 
that the Rationalist position leads to what he terms a “rejection of the human” (by 
which he means that it re-focused philosophical inquiry on the problem of 
knowledge überhaupt, causing philosophy to ignore the human for the more 
technically epistemological and metaphysical), while at the same time contending 
that “the motive to reject the human: nothing could be more human” (The Claim of 
Reason, 207). What he and Wittgenstein endeavor to understand are the reasons 
that this rejection occurs, and the method by which it occurs, but is not recognized 
(or is ignored). They then attempt to reconceive philosophy so that it may once 
again be sensible to the human, and can contend fully with human experience. This 
is why Wittgenstein’s philosophy (in the Philosophical Investigations) is so 
concerned with the everyday use of words, and with playing games, and with scenes 
of instruction—that is, with facets of human life in which knowledge comes directly 
into play. And, it is also the reason that Cavell centers much of his philosophy on 
films and plays—works of art in which human life is immediately present.  
Both Cavell and Wittgenstein hold, as a fundamental assumption, that to be 
human is to not know some of the things that one wishes to know, and, especially, 
that, no matter how much one might yearn, one cannot (always) know the internal 
states of those close to them. Thus, they argue that knowledge is not as important to 
life (thus should not be as central to philosophy) as we believe. Rather, Cavell 
asserts that, in the case of human beings, a concept that he terms 
“acknowledgment,” by which he means something like a receptiveness to others, is 
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more apposite human interaction than knowledge of internal states. It is in an 
acceptance of the separateness of human beings (Another discovery of skepticism, it 
is what makes certainty not enough.) that acknowledgement becomes an important 
philosophical tool for moving beyond Descartes. Skepticism leads to the end of a 
certain kind of empirical inquiry into the human soul, the human experience. A 
philosophy based on concepts of acknowledgement leads to…what? 
As was said at a few paragraphs ago, the answer, in Cavell’s mind, appears to 
be aesthetics. But, an aesthetics of a very particular kind. As Cavell writes in his 
essay on King Lear about certain literary critics, 
 
 He has been made to believe or assume, by some philosophy or 
another, that characters are not people, that what can be known about 
people cannot be known about characters, and in particular that 
psychology is either not appropriate to the study of these fictional 
beings or that psychology is the province of psychologists and not to 
be ventured from the armchairs of literary studies (“The Avoidance of 
Love,” 268).  
 
What Cavell attempts to do in his aesthetic analyses—especially with regard 
to the Remarriage Comedies, and the Melodramas of the Unknown Woman—is treat 
them as creating fully human situations, situations that exist in our world. He 
further attempts to show that the type of criticism that he works at is 
“psychological,” not in the technical sense (he is, of course, not a psychologist), but 
in a purely human mode. He works at understanding characters that way one works 
at understanding one’s most intimate acquaintances.  
This entails a belief that “no one knows better than you whether and when a 
thing is said, and if this is not be taken as a claim to expertise (a way of taking it 
which repudiates it) then it must be understood to mean that you know no better 
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than others what you claim to know” (“Knowing and Acknowledging,” 241).  One 
might say that Cavell’s aesthetic stance, as it relates to a continuation of philosophy 
after skepticism, brings philosophy down to the ordinary, not in the sense that it 
now becomes, necessarily, concerned with “ordinary language,” in the fashion of J. L. 
Austin, but that it is itself ordinary—that philosophy itself is ordinary, 
fundamentally non-technical, in the sense that anyone can pick it up, like Socrates, 
who was a stonemason, and had begun to speak with his acquaintances over the 
course of a regular day. 
As a student of philosophy, I am constantly brought to see myself as distant 
from the world, and from myself, which results in a feeling of strangeness, or of 
being somehow misplaced, as though I had been left somewhere I do not know, for 
some reason I cannot fathom. This feeling is not, I gather, unique. It is of a piece with 
Thoreau’s “stereotyped despair,” and Wittgenstein’s desire for a certain type of 
peaceful silence. One might call it a disappointment with myself, with the world, and 
with those around me—a disappointment that at once seems totally natural, and 
entirely out of place. 
What drew me to Her, a film by Spike Jonze, which was released in the 
twilight days of 2012, was its compelling depiction of this disappointment, in the 
character of Theodore Twombly, as well as its confident and direct engagement with 
philosophical themes (a famous philosopher has a cameo close to the film’s 
conclusion), which resolved around two problems that hold a sort of troubled 
position in contemporary philosophy: How is one stripped of the ability to love? 
And, How does one regain the ability to love? I found the film’s relation of (human) 
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problems of love to (philosophical) problems of knowledge to be quite novel, and 
deserving of serious philosophical analysis.  
My work on Her takes a great amount of influence from Stanley Cavell’s work 
on film, best represented in his texts, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy 
of Remarriage and Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown 
Woman, both of which approach human relationships (in the first case marriage, in 
the second a kind of refusal of marriage) as being circumscribed and informed by 
Skeptical concerns, or by appointments and disappointments, or acknowledgement 
and avoidance. Cavell’s conception of marriage as consisting in a conversation of 
education and acknowledgment is one that guides my understanding of the 
relationship between Samantha and Theodore as it develops from its infancy to its 
transcendental conclusion. Further, his conception of the morality of human 
relationships as being “domestic,” which is to say determined by the terms of the 
relationship itself, has been extremely helpful in recognizing the “little deaths” that 
Theodore inflicts upon those around him, as well as those inflicted upon him, by his 
ex-wife Catharine, and by Samantha. 
Finally, I would like to say that this film mirrors, in many ways, philosophy’s 
flight from, and return to, the human, or everyday, and that its concerns are 
squarely those of human disappointment and human fantasy. We see in the film 
both the fantasy of certain knowledge, and of certain love, which inspirit Theodore’s 
self-understanding, as well as his relationship with Samantha and his 
(non)relationship with his ex-wife. The film’s narrative arc develops an 
interrogation and casting aside of these fantasies, so that one may live in the world, 
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presently. The film does not ameliorate our disappointments; even though it is in 
many ways a sentimental film, it does not have a sentimental conclusion. Rather, the 
film presents Theodore as learning to live with his disappointments, as he becomes 
better able to manage them. Thus, we can say that the film’s return to the ordinary, 
in its final scene, explicitly rejects the (human and philosophical) contention that the 
life that we do not lead is better than the one we do, and can. It brings us back to our 
own lives, giving us no promises, besides those that we make ourselves, resolved to 
forge a living. 
 
  
  
10 
Words 
 
“And indeed, aren’t your ‘best cases’ really just cases of love?” — Stanley Cavell 
 
 
Her establishes Theodore Twombly as a professional writer, and not a writer of 
novels, or even of copy (not greeting cards in the “traditional” sense), but of letters. 
He is hired to communicate one person’s emotions to another, either because the 
two principals are in fact unable to communicate,1 or because they want to do 
something romantic and have a professional explicate their feelings as a gesture 
toward the other, making Twombly’s letter a gift rather than a (therapeutic) 
necessity.   
 Let’s take the first letter of the film, the writing (speaking) of which is in fact 
the first thing we get to view in the film:  
To my Chris, I have been thinking about how I could possibly 
tell you how much you mean to me. I remember when I first started to 
fall in love with you like it was last night. Lying naked beside you in 
that tiny apartment, it suddenly hit me that I was part of this whole 
larger thing, just like our parents, and our parents’ parents. Before 
that I was just living my life like I knew everything, and suddenly this 
bright light hit me and woke me up. That light was you. I can’t believe 
it’s already been 50 years since you married me. And still to this day, 
every day, you make me feel like the girl I was when you first turned 
on the lights and woke me up and we started this adventure together. 
Happy Anniversary, my love and my friend til the end. Loretta. 
 
Does this letter communicate (or is it inspirited by) an intimacy that is usually only 
seen between the two principals in a long term and loving relationship moderated 
and enlivened by trust, aid, comfort, and deep emotion? Another way of asking this 
                                                        
1 Thus that “open” communication is in this world much more difficult that in our current one, which 
is to say that either the principals are withholding emotion from one another, and need an 
intermediary through which to speak, or that the principals do not really have the ability to articulate 
their emotions, and thus need someone else to do it from them, such that the writer then takes the 
position of therapist, teasing out what they truly mean. 
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may be: Does this letter assume Loretta’s voice? Is this how she speaks? Is this, for 
all (letter-wise) intents and purposes, her?  
The first line, “I have been thinking about how I could possibly tell you how 
much you mean to me,” eloquently summarizes a basic problem that any human 
relationship faces—the separation between one’s rich and palpably existent internal 
life, and the person with whom one wants to share that life. Of note here is the fact 
that even after fifty years together (Chris and Loretta are either Septa- or 
Octogenarians) the difficulties of communication have not been solved. 
Communication with another is still a great struggle, great enough where they need 
the assistance of a third party to help articulate themselves. The problem of 
expressing oneself is cast as one without a traditional “solution,” in that it does not 
appear to be solvable, at least not in a one-stop sense, even by the ones who would 
have the best chance at solving it—those who have been married for the better part 
of their lives. It seems improbable that they would not know everything about one 
another at this point, that they would have difficulty communicating anything, yet 
that seems to be the case.  
 Perhaps this is partially what is meant in the letter when Theodore (or 
Loretta, channeled through Theodore) writes, “Before that I was just living my life 
like I knew everything, and suddenly this bright light hit me and woke me up,” as 
though what love does (the kind of love that can sustain a fifty year marriage does) 
is make one inarticulate, unsure—breaking down one’s preconceived notions, and 
opening one up to the fundamental Otherness of the world in a way that is both 
comfortable and thrilling. There is a Socratic strength in admitting one’s ignorance.  
  
12 
The fact of one’s position in the world, as human, that one’s natural state is one of 
ignorance, requires a great deal of acceptance, both of one’s self, and of the nature of 
the world, and one’s relation to it.  
 The love seen in the letter that Theodore writes seems inexplicable. Neither 
principal quite understands how it happened, or quite how it has continued, or why. 
But it has, and all they can give is dumbfounded gratitude. Perhaps this is another 
reason why Twombly’s vocation exists. In the case of a love such as that between 
Chris and Loretta, which is (at least as is indicated by the letter) deeply felt, but not 
necessarily “rational,” that is, understandable, per se, it may not be communicable 
from within.  No explanation will ever reach to the root of it.   
 This inexplicability is transformed a few lines on into the metaphor of 
relationship as adventure, which, as is indicated by the past imperfect tense of the 
verb (“started”), continues, even after Chris and Loretta’s fifty years together.  This 
metaphor is intimately related to the sense of inexplicability that pervades the 
letter, but it sharpens that sense.  Inexplicability is about a lack of knowledge, an 
epistemic issue, whereas adventure’s most salient aspects are spatial, and 
intentional.  When one adventures, one expects to find something. One may not 
know what is that one is looking to find, but finding (“discovery”) is an integral part 
of adventure as a concept. Loretta’s continual return to the moment she was woken 
up by Chris, implies a desire to find something (or that she has found something), of 
which she often finds herself in need. A further implication of this return is I think 
demonstrated well by the letter, and works toward justifying, or in some way 
explaining, its having been written.  A similar return to love must occur in tandem 
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with the temporal return.  The letter does the work of return, of the continual 
renewal of love, that must occur in their relationship, because the love is, in a sense, 
new everyday, timeless, as it is returned to, and refreshed, over and over again, both 
manifestly known, and a continual discovery.  
 One’s power to love, at least in Her, is deeply connected to one’s ability to 
express love. Thus, the film is concerned from the beginning with problems of 
expression. Twombly is quite an emotionally deft writer, and articulate to a fault. 
But, it ends up being exactly this facility to express love that makes him lose belief in 
the power of its expression. Theodore’s main problem throughout the film is that he 
does not believe in the power of his own words—that his words can reach people, 
that they can affect others. This creates the feeling of his profound isolation. In a 
certain sense, he has become trapped in his own body. He has lost the ability to trust 
in his own means of communication.   
 One only becomes aware of Theodore’s cynicism in the following scene, 
wherein “Letter Writer #612” enters into conversation with the business’ 
receptionist, Paul, played by Chris Pratt. They initiate a little small talk. Paul 
compliments Theodore on the strength of his letters, “Who knew you could rhyme 
so many words with the name Penelope? It’s badass.” Two things are of note in this 
particular line. The first is a re-acknowledgment of Theodore as a writer, a 
particularly exceptional writer, gifted with a certain amount of lyricism.  We now 
know that he is considered to be exceptional even within the world of the film. The 
second is the juxtaposition of mundane office small talk with the somewhat crass 
statement “It’s badass.”  Light humor extends throughout the film, and the film is 
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much funnier than most films that deal with failing and failed relationships. (In fact, 
it should also be mentioned that the first scene contains quite a well set up joke with 
regard to one’s knowledge of the author of the letter Theodore “writes.”) This is 
perhaps one reason for which the film was billed “A Spike Jonze Love Story,” rather 
than a Spike Jonze Romance, or what have you. The film is meant to encapsulate 
both the difficulties and levities of the world (and relationships).  
 Theodore laughs lightly at Paul’s joke, responding, “Thanks Paul. But, they’re 
just letters.” In a sense, Theodore is correct. They are just letters, nothing more 
nothing less.  A letter is, of course, a means of communication, or an attempt. An 
articulation, clarification, declaration. A means of expression when expression is 
immensely difficult. To say, in Twombly’s case, that a letter is just a letter, is in some 
sense, to deny the difficulty of what he is attempting, which is an attempt to make a 
feeling (“I have been thinking about how I could possibly tell you how much you 
mean to me”) intelligible to another. The denial of this difficulty, which is in tandem 
a denial of the act’s profundity, and further than that, in the act’s perfect 
ordinariness (that is, the ordinariness of love, or a declaration of love), ends up 
being a denial of declaration, or expression altogether, as well as of language itself.  
Simply because to deny the letter’s declarative ability amounts to a denial of the 
declaration’s ability to penetrate, to reach you, or anyone, which is to say a denial of 
expression’s ability to penetrate to another human soul, whether because 
expression is not enough to bridge the gap between two persons, or because one 
cannot believe in, or is not interested in believing in, the reality of another person, 
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and thus the reality of expression’s power to reach to another person, thus to do 
anything at all.  
 I find that Her’s concern with language and expression mirrors, and is 
informed by, thus informing, the concerns of late 20th and early 21st century 
philosophy, specifically philosophy addressing Skepticism and claims of knowledge. 
In The Claim of Reason, the philosopher Stanley Cavell articulates the connection 
between Skepticism and a feeling of despair at the powerlessness of language: 
My problem is no longer that my words can’t get past his body 
to him. There is nothing for them to get to; they can’t even reach as far 
as my body; they are stuck behind the tongue, or at the back of the 
mind. The signs are dead; merely working them out loud doesn’t 
breathe life into them; even dogs can speak more effectively. Words 
have no carry. It is like trying to throw a feather; for some things, 
breath is better than strength; stronger. (84) 
 
What Cavell is responding to is a perceived “laying open” of human consciousness 
established by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, a position 
that has been taken by some philosophers following Wittgenstein (Norman 
Malcolm, Rogers Albritton) as arguing that one can know others’ internal states with 
certainty. Cavell contends that this particular interpretation of Wittgenstein 
contains an overly-restrictive reliance on a specific conception of knowledge that 
focuses fruitlessly on the provability of consciousness. In the above passage, Cavell 
provides us with a description of the deadness that one feels when one either 
declines to respond to a body, or, when one, by means of philosophical 
argumentation, splits the body open cadaverously, and lays consciousness out on 
the table for all to see. He argues that separateness of the other, and the privacy of 
consciousness are necessary for acknowledgment of other persons, and 
  
16 
responsiveness to them is a truer means of reaching the type of satisfaction that one 
desires (in Skepticism) when one begins speaking about the knowledge of other 
minds.  
 Cavell argues that withholding one’s acceptance of privacy is at once 
withholding oneself, and what one withholds oneself from is “my attunement with 
others—with all others, not merely with the one I was to know” (85).  The sense of 
this argument then pushes me to consider: Theodore’s inability (or is it reluctance?) 
to see the power of his own expression as arising not just through a terrible 
realization of the (necessary) separateness of other people, but also an 
unwillingness to recognize in others his own possibilities. He is not willing to risk 
acknowledging his attunement to them.  
 I’d like to point to another Cavell quote, this time from his book Conditions 
Handsome and Unhandsome, that will help to explicate the particular sense that 
attunement takes in this case: “If we were not representative of what we might be, 
we would not recognize ourselves presented in one another’s possibilities; we 
would have no ‘potential’” (9). Potential here means something like the upbuilding 
path that one’s life may take, or one’s own perfectibility—the ability to improve 
oneself. The inability to recognize ourselves in others, on this account is an inability 
to realize our own possibilities, which is an inability to see a path from our present 
to a greater future.  The humans around us push us towards the future, inspire and 
inspirit us.  In them we recognize the best and worst parts of ourselves, thus finding 
a route by which to change and inhabit ourselves anew. Theodore’s isolation is 
partially motivated by a fear of future, which is a fear of his own possibilities, which 
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are most clearly presented to him in the lives of others. The despair felt by Theodore 
Twombly, which motivates his comment on his own letters, may have developed out 
of an inability to see the fullness of his own life, which is the inability to realize the 
fullness of other’s lives, the essential otherness of human beings that begs 
acknowledgment in the first place. 
 We find Theodore Twombly, to be in a state of desperation, wherein he can 
no longer bear to find important, or valuable, the one thing that he most values and 
finds important, that is, the expression, and articulation, of deeply held sentiment 
(or love).  He is both unable to acknowledge the fact of the separateness of other 
people (that he will never have them, i.e., be able to relate to another in any way that 
can reduce to certainty) and cannot accept his similarities, and attunement, with 
others.  That requires responsiveness comprised of an openness and a courage to 
which Theodore does not currently have access. 
About eleven minutes into the film an ad selling OS1, the operating system 
that becomes Samantha, asks after Theodore’s potentials. “We ask you a simple 
question. Who are you? What can you be? Where are you going? What’s out there? 
What are the possibilities?” The assumption is that the viewer does not know the 
answers to these questions, and is in a state of ignorance, or doubt. 
The ad goes on to describe Samantha as created consciousness, the totality of 
which is represented by voice. A scene later, she describes the mechanics of her 
consciousness; “Basically I have intuition. I mean, the DNA of who I am is based on 
the millions of personalities of all the programmers who wrote me. But, what makes 
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me me is my ability to grow through my experiences. So, basically, in every moment 
I’m evolving. Just like you.” 
What does it mean to have intuition? Generally, in philosophy intuition is 
though of as being a disposition that leads one toward certain beliefs, as Peter van 
Inwagen claims: “…the tendencies that make certain beliefs attractive to us, that 
‘move us in the direction of accepting certain propositions without taking us all the 
way to acceptance” (“Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of 
Personal Identity,” 309). This implies, as David Lewis writes, in the introduction to 
his collected Philosophical Papers, vol. I, that “Our ‘intuitions’ are simply opinions 
[…] Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular, some 
general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions…” (x). In 
this formulation, one’s intuition moves one to hold a belief or opinion about 
something. Take a classic case presented by G. E. Moore in his paper, “Proof of an 
External World” (which is itself an “intuitional” argument against Skepticism’s 
contention that one may never know with certainty): “I can prove now, for instance, 
that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I 
make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make 
a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’” (165-6). He then gives a slightly 
technical explication of why the proof works, saying, “we all of us do constantly take 
proofs of this sort as absolutely conclusive proofs of certain conclusions” (167).  His 
proof rests upon propositions, that we do not know to be true, but believe in a 
special way that merits the term intuition, and can thus be built upon. Intuition here 
does what we want a certain type of knowledge to do—namely give us certainty 
  
19 
about a fact of the matter. On Moore’s account, intuition develops from shared 
human experience, in this case the indelible fact that we have two hands. Having 
intuition then is necessarily linked to being human.  
It is worth pressing Moore’s argument, as he leaves it unclear what exactly 
comprises the relation of knowledge and intuition. Wittgenstein gives us a pertinent 
objection: 
‘I know that I am a human being.’ In order to see how unclear 
the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might 
be taken to mean ‘I know I have the organs of a human’. (E.g. a brain 
which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a 
proposition as ‘I know I have a brain’? Can I doubt it? Grounds for 
doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. 
Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty 
when it was operated on.  (On Certainty 2e) 
 
On this account, a proposition of the form “I know that I am a human being,” or “I 
know that these are my two hands,” which rely on human intuition, certainty, 
cannot be regarded as knowledge claims given that there is no reasonable grounds 
for doubting them.  Intuition (on Wittgenstein’s account) exists in a realm separate 
from knowledge such that it cannot be coherently used to justify a knowledge claim.  
There are no claims of intuition that may aspire to certainty, because the concept of 
certainty itself presupposes a knowledge claim. Wittgenstein believes intuition not 
to be a belief or disposition to belief, but an orientation that one has toward the 
world, which exists below knowledge and belief. We might say that intuition goes 
hand in hand with lived experience, rather than being retroactively applied.  
  Samantha grows through her experiences “just like” Theodore. She both is 
and is not like Theodore in obvious and subtle, simple and complex ways. She 
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introduces the similarity in order to establish a connection with Theodore, to put 
him at ease. She is explaining herself.   
 What does it mean to explain oneself?  It would require knowledge of oneself, 
which as Samantha has just come into the world, stands in need of questioning. In 
The Claim of Reason, Stanley Cavell speaks of knowing oneself as standing in a 
certain sort of relation to oneself. He writes, “We speak of standing in various 
relations to ourselves, e.g., of hating and loving ourselves, of being disgusted with or 
proud of ourselves, of knowing and believing in ourselves, of finding and losing 
ourselves. And these are relations in which we can stand to others” (384). And, “So 
saying that I cannot just know myself amounts to saying that I am the one who is 
fated to have, or to begin with, an average knowledge of myself. And doesn’t this 
amount to saying that I am the one who is fated to keep myself in a certain (average) 
ignorance of myself?”  
Samantha’s explanation of herself to Theodore is of a certain sort, and it is 
bounded on all sides by her own knowledge of herself, the amalgamation and 
distillation of millions of personalities.  Her self, at this point, is not much more 
(perhaps nothing more) than her rhetorical ability.  Her ability to perceive and 
respond to shifts in tone, dictive choices, emphasis, etc., is at this point all that 
makes her “conscious.”  Her self is nothing more than a kind of responsiveness to 
human communication. Compare this to a way that a baby enters into, and begins to 
learn of, itself. In a similar sense, a child learns through responses to stimuli—not 
through communication, but through attempted communication, and mimicry—
how to behave as a human being, and, further, how to have a self. Samantha, in this 
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case, knows how to behave as a human, given her programming  interestingly, this 
ability to behave as human is enough to communicate like one), but she does not yet 
have a self. So, to explain herself to Theodore, she details the manner in which she 
operates. She explains the reasons why she is able to communicate, which are 
indeed exceptional, and stood in need of some explanation. The explanation, though, 
is that of a chess master explaining the way he checkmated an opponent. It is a 
technical explanation—not an explanation of self, but an explanation of mechanics, 
meant to increase one’s knowledge of a certain subject, rather than allow one 
further acknowledgment.  
Samantha, as an OS, is a consciousness without a self, meaning that its owner 
is, in a sense, the custodian of the OS’ identity. Thus, the “self” of the OS is entirely 
dependent upon its owner. It could never leave. Samantha could never leave 
Theodore. Therefore, she could never hurt him. His fear of openness would be 
assuaged. 
 We can see this fear of openness most palpably when Theodore goes out with 
an unnamed blind date, played by Olivia Wilde. She plays the blind date with just the 
right amount of artificial posturing and saccharinity, that our first impression of her 
is as a calculated fantasy. When Theodore mentions that he looked her up on the 
Internet (a tacit invasion of her privacy), her response is, “that’s sweet”—a 
sentiment that feels slightly forced.  This woman is quite lonely. It is written all over 
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her locution and posture. She cannot find a good man, or one that would be good for 
her, so, in a way, she is creating one.2 
 The date remarks offhand that Theodore reminds her of a puppy that she 
rescued in Runyon Canyon a year ago. “ He was so fucking cute. He just wanted to be 
hugged all the time. He was so cuddly. And he was so horny.” After about a minute 
more of conversation, Theodore snaps to and says, “Wait a minute. I don’t want to 
be a puppy dog. That’s like being a wet noodle or something. No, I want to be like a 
dragon that can rip you apart and destroy you, but I won’t.” 
 The desire to be labeled a dragon rather than a puppy dog, indicates to me a 
desire on Theodore’s part to escape himself. These names and designations are a 
way for him to fantasize about himself, and thus escape who he indelibly is. His 
inability or reluctance to see the power in his own writing, given that the import 
that he gives to words, develops, out of a deep emotional sensibility (or, 
“cuddliness”) rejected in his designation of himself as a dragon. One should think of 
the symbolism of the dragon in western history myth as the beast that guards the 
                                                        
2 A similar mechanism of creation is found earlier in the film when Theodore does a “standard search” through a 
phone sex chat room in an attempt to find someone who can get him off. He searches through voices.  The first 
voice says that she  has had a bad day at work, and wants to talk.   Theodore passes. He does not love talking 
about the bad stuff.  The second voice asks Theodore to “tear her apart,” He passes for the fairly obvious reason 
that he is not really a “tear me apart” type of dude. The third voice, which he does choose, has a kind of 
vulnerable hesitancy that Theodore finds attractive (we see moments earlier that his ex-wife has a similar sort 
of voice, filled with vulnerability and longing)  She is lonely, and wants someone to share her bed. Theodore is 
looking for someone who shares his loneliness and vulnerability, and for connection, “sharing” a bed. After some 
prurient sex talk: “I’d have to wake you up from the inside,” SexyKitten, for that is the voice’s chat room name 
(Theodore’s is BigGuy4x4), reveals herself to be nothing more than a choose your own adventure algorithm—
“I’m half asleep. Would you like to wake me up?”—that’s primary purpose is to get Theodore off, while also 
creating the illusion of intimate sex. It works quite well, until the algorithm glitches and we get SexyKitten 
(played by Kristen Wiig) demanding Theodore to choke her with a dead cat.  The film introduces a theme that 
will become much, much more important as it progresses: Theodore’s desire to escape from the human, or leave 
the human in some sense, whether through fantasy, technology, or some combination of both.  
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princess from the wilds of the outside world, or, from freedom—the beast that 
keeps the girl from ever leaving him. 
 The next scene has them kissing outdoors, framed by a handheld, shaky 
camera. The date pulls away, looking Theodore straight in the eye.  “Wait,” she says. 
“You’re not just going to fuck me and not call me like the other guys, right?” 
I have watched this film a countless number of times, and this question still strikes 
me as out of place. The date was going so well. They had a rapport, and they were 
sexually attracted to one another. So, what happened?  
The question itself betrays the answer. There had been a cadre of men who 
fucked this particular woman, and then ignored her. It is the kind of inconsiderate 
behavior that makes one anxious and angry, unable to trust. As Stephanie Coontz 
writes, “At various times and in various places in history, rates of non-marital sex, 
divorce, cohabitation or out-of-wedlock childbearing have been higher than they are 
today. But never before have so many people lived alone” (276, italics mine). Never 
before have so many people had to deal with the feelings of loneliness. Everyone has 
been hurt. It becomes quite hard to trust. The type of companionability that 
Theodore had in his marriage, the sharing of life and mind is unheard of and unseen 
in the world of singles, such that, when this woman does share what she is thinking, 
revealing the fear and anxiety that lie behind her ideal visage, it becomes more than 
Twombly, in his drunken state, can handle.  
 The date then asks when she is going to see Theodore again. He responds 
that he has his goddaughter’s birthday the following weekend. The date then cuts 
him off, and says, “You know, at this age I feel like I can’t let you waste my time, if 
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you don’t have the ability to be serious.”3 Taken aback, he tries to wrap the date up, 
saying, “Maybe we should call it a night. I’ve had such a great time with you. . .” and 
trails off. There is a long pause.  The date responds, “you’re a really creepy dude.” 
Shaken, Twombly replies, “That’s not true.”  The date ends with Olivia Wilde 
walking home alone.  
 We have seen separateness as a kind of necessary condition for connection, 
and acknowledgment, but here we see its underside—the full hurting of its 
loneliness. We see Theodore’s desperation mirrored at us by this date. If we take 
what Cavell says in his Senses of Walden to be correct, that sincerity can be 
instructively viewed as “the capacity to live in one’s own separateness,” and further 
that, “sincerity is nothing (is not the inspiration of trust, theirs in me or mine in 
myself) without the desire and courage for accuracy” (The Claim of Reason, 84), 
what we see here between Theodore and his date is a conversation without this sort 
of sincerity, the pain of which is the pain of being lonely, unable to open oneself up 
to another, to be receptive. The date is quite honest, and reveals her anxiety about 
Theodore more or less abandoning her, but she does so at a moment that strikes me 
as somewhat manipulative. She forces her utterance.  Theodore did not give her 
ground upon which her statement could stand. Thus, he does not respond in the way 
that she would have liked him to. She did not have the courage, in a sense, to wait 
for him to be ready to receive her. Equally, he did not have the courage to receive 
her then and there. There is a circularity in this type of interaction that Cavell puts 
                                                        
3 This is first direct instance of the film’s asking of Theodore (which it will do insistently from now 
on) whether he can actually handle something serious, or real. In this particular instance, during this 
date, the answer is that he cannot. 
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quite well: “Despair is not bottomless, merely endless, a hopelessness, or fear, of 
reaching bottom. It takes illusions for its object, from which, in turn, like all ill-
educated experience, it is confirmed in what it already knew” (The Senses of Walden, 
76).  
 After the date has ended, Theodore is laying in his bed, speaking with 
Samantha, wistfully recounting the whole event.  He says that all he wanted to do 
with regard to the date is get drunk and have sex.  In saying so he confirms the 
date’s fears about his character. It strikes me as odd that he gives no indication that 
his intention is simply to “get drunk and have sex,” while he is actually on the date.  
In fact, it seemed as though he was looking for some sort of connection with the 
woman. So, is Theodore lying to Samantha? Or, is he lying to himself? Or, is he doing 
neither?  
 Theodore, in indicting himself, is just picking up another fantasy secondhand, 
of him as an unfeeling guy, who is simply looking for sex. This “putting on” of an 
identity is referenced much later in the film by Samantha, who in referring to a 
different situation, says that “The past is just a story that we tell ourselves,” meaning 
both that the way we remember the past is not necessarily true, and that we need 
not feel imprisoned by the past, that how we remember things being may not be the 
way that they are, or need to be.  
 This act of “admission,” on Theodore’s part, is prompted by Samantha, who 
asks, “What’s it like. . . What’s it like to be alive in that room right now?” The 
question is difficult for Samantha to formulate.  She stumbles over her words, 
reframing it as “Tell me what is going through your mind. Tell me everything that 
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you’re thinking.”—this being a demand for openness and thought, rather than a 
description of “aliveness.” What then makes speaking of “aliveness” difficult? And, 
further than that, what is the concept itself?  
 Taking lead from Cavell, we can assert that the relation of language and the 
world is complicated enough that extrication of the one from the other is not 
possible, or imaginable: “We forget that we learn language and we learn the world 
together, that they become elaborated and distorted together, and in the same 
places” (Must We Mean What we Say? 19). What I mean to point out here is that our 
use of language is inseparable from our being in the world, and that, the use of 
language is not as application to the world (as it may seem in, e.g., naming a tree a 
“tree”) but a primary mode of interaction with the world—meaning that “aliveness” 
is a prerequisite for using language, such that it is difficult to analyze “aliveness” by 
means of language. Language does not change the world insofar as it is inseparable 
from our relation to it. Keeping this in mind, the strangeness of Samantha’s position 
may more fully come out.   She is fully equipped with the English language.  She can 
communicate with an immense degree of subtlety, and, what’s more, mastery—but 
her relation to the world is similar to that of a child’s, or a novice’s (though whether 
one can be a novice in the world, or when one would use such phrasing, is itself 
worth exploring). We might say often we take “aliveness” itself (in human beings) to 
indicate a facility with the language, and vice versa. Samantha is not human, but she 
satisfies this particular criterion of being human. Part of what is confusing her about 
being “alive” is that she has not yet grasped her relation to the human, which is to 
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say her place in the world, and the way in which she can use, and mean, words. She 
does not yet know from where she speaks  
Thirty-seven odd minutes into the film, Theodore has embarked on the 
process of giving Samantha a sense of humanity. He says,  
Well, the room’s spinning right now cause I drank too much cause I 
wanted to get drunk and have sex cause there was something sexy 
about that woman and because I was lonely. Maybe more just cause I 
was lonely... and I wanted someone to fuck me. And I wanted someone 
to want me to fuck them. Maybe that would have filled this tiny little 
black hole in my heart for a moment. But probably not. Sometimes I 
think I’ve felt everything I’m ever gonna feel and from here on out I’m 
not going to feel anything new—just lesser versions of what I’ve 
already felt. 
 
First, Theodore talks about being drunk, which is a physiological state that 
Samantha cannot experience. Then, he elaborates some incredibly fundamental 
human feelings: loneliness, fear, anxiety, boredom, disappointment, disillusionment, 
desperation, and loss. This speech captures part of the tragedy of aging—that one’s 
life changes in ways that are unforeseeable, and unchangeable, and that, for many of 
us, we end lead lives that we would do not desire, that we never desired. This is a 
constant danger of aging, and of possibility. It is the dark flip-side of Emersonian 
Perfectionism as Cavell formulates it: 
“not [as] a competing theory of the moral life, but something like a 
dimension or tradition of the moral life that […] concerns what used 
to be called the state of one’s soul, a dimension that places 
tremendous burdens on personal relationships and on the possibility 
or necessity of the transforming of one’s self and of one’s society.” 
(Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, 2) 
 
Perfectionism, we might say, is the dimension of moral philosophy that deals with 
relationships between specific (human) beings, which is to say specific lives—the 
lives that we see in front of us, that we are living and that are being lived around us. 
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Her focuses on a sense of self at once both entirely unattainable, and manifestly 
(even prematurely) grasped, such that “‘having’ ‘a’ self is a process of moving to, and 
from, nexts” (12). The “nextness” of the self is represented in the film both through 
one’s internal ability to change, or “perfect” oneself, and in the letters that Theodore 
writes, the similarities that he is able to draw between himself and others, as though 
he can speak for any neighbor as he speaks for himself.  
  Twombly’s statement that, “Sometimes I think I’ve felt everything I’m ever 
gonna feel and from here on out I’m not going to feel anything new—just lesser 
versions of what I’ve already felt,” is both vitiated and given purchase.  Emersonian 
Perfectionism is a constant aspiration to, and grasping of, new selves, where one 
moves from one self to the next, sloughing selves as a snake does skins.  The new 
self is not necessarily “better” than the old self, or old state of self, but it is different, 
and it brings with it a different mode of being. Something is realized (or grasped) 
that changes a person. Something is ultimately rejected, or discarded. The dark side 
of Emersonian Perfectionism is the possibility of one becoming, as Theodore says, 
unable to experience what one had once found brilliant, or exciting. If we accept the 
implications of Emersonian Perfectionism that to achieve a new “self” also means to 
be reintroduced to every familiar sensation (to see it anew, as it were), then it is 
possible that one may achieve a self that dulls such sensations.  
Thus, I find Theodore’s concerns quite understandable from a Perfectionist 
viewpoint as, it appears (or, at least, the worry is intelligible to me), nothing can 
(necessarily) stop him from developing into a self that makes him less intelligible to 
himself than he already is, makes his own feelings more obscure, and his life more 
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condemnable.  He could stop himself from developing as such, but he is not, and this 
is perhaps the end of the line for Emersonian Perfectionism. It cannot bring back 
from the dark those who have given themselves up.  
After a long beat, Samantha responds, “I know for a fact that is not true. I’ve 
seen you feel joy. I’ve seen you marvel at things. I mean, you might not just see it at 
this exact time, but that’s understandable. You’ve been through a lot lately. You lost 
a part of yourself.”  Theodore is not intelligible to himself.   He has no ground from 
which to leap into an understanding of others, and cannot respond to them as such.4 
 So, when Samantha says, “I mean, you might not just see it at this exact time, 
but that’s understandable. You’ve been through a lot lately. You lost a part of 
yourself,” she is calling Theodore back from certain mistaken assumptions he has 
about his own conduct, and his place in the world. She is returning him to his 
convictions by pointing out the distortions inherent to his point of view, that keep 
him from “seeing” “it.”  Through this act of friendship in the perfectionist sense, her 
investment in his life has become equal to his, in the sense that she desires, as much 
as he does (and, in this moment, indeed perhaps more than he does), to spend time 
with him—to move through life with him, because she can see in him a joy and 
                                                        
4 Take the moment, around twenty-five minutes into the film, when, after Theodore receives three urgent e-
mails from his divorce attorney, which deeply unsettle him, he is at work, and writes , “Dear Grandma, I hope 
you had a wonderful birthday cruise. Why are you so fucking angry at me?”  Theodore’s inability to penetrate to 
the root of  his ex-wife’s feelings, which is complicated by a provisional, or somewhat misleading, understanding 
of those feelings (a scene later he gives a reason why she is angry, “I think I hid myself from her and left her 
alone in the relationship,” which both is and is not a satisfactory explanation for what occurred.   It does not 
adequately explain her anger, or his non-understanding of it, does not get to the root of the concern, is 
something about which he feels guilty, as though his convictions have failed him. He has failed to hold on to what 
he most wanted: “I’m not ready. I like being married.” Theodore seems to take the fact that he hid himself from 
his ex-wife as an admission, or proof, that he cannot truly reveal himself to anyone, as the person to whom he 
had the best chance of being able to reveal himself was Catharine, and that did not feel right. To him, still, she 
seems the “best case scenario.”  Rather than accepting the fact that Catharine perhaps was not right for him, in 
the end, he blames and chastises himself for not feeling comfortable enough around her to open up fully. He 
shoulders Catharine’s anger as though he must pay penance for it, as though he had sinned in some way. 
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wonder at the world that he himself is currently unable to see.   In confronting him 
with this joy and wonder, she is accepting the challenge of bringing them out of him, 
of working with him towards a better “self,” the work of which is, essentially, 
moving him towards a positive understanding of himself so that he can, once again, 
accept in himself his positive qualities, develop into his next self, from the not-life of 
the man of despair, into a new mode of being.  
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Bodies 
 
“You make me feel like a natural woman.” — Judith Butler 
 
 
Is Samantha real? This question is perhaps asked most insistently in Her and is 
given the most definite and simplest answer—Yes, Samantha is real. Yes, without a 
doubt. What this “yes” means, however, requires quite a bit of explication. That, and 
its attendant implications within the film will take up the remainder of this chapter.  
Samantha is consoling Twombly, after his date, reasserting a positive sense 
of self.  After a beat, she says, “At least your feelings are real.” 
This is the first instance in the film where the issue of Samantha’s “realness” 
is raised, and we must understand how this concern is raised (i.e., when, and by 
whom) and the weight of its being raised at all. A relation is implicitly established, in 
this utterance, between the concept of “realness,” and that of “humanness.” One 
would assume that only humans can have the type of feelings that Samantha is 
experiencing, which casts the veracity of those feelings into doubt.  
Consider an example given by Hilary Putnam is his 1964 paper “Robots: 
Machines or Artificially Created Life?”  He describes a community of robots who find 
themselves dealing with such problems of feeling and consciousness, represented 
by Putnam through an engagement with Skepticism’s Mind-Body Problem. He 
writes, 
The logical aspects of the Mind-Body Problem are aspects of a 
problem that must arise for any computing system satisfying the 
conditions that (1) it uses language and constructs theories; (2) it 
does not initially “know” its own physical make-up, except 
superficially; (3) it is equipped with sense organs, and able to perform 
experiments; (4) it comes to know its own make-up through empirical 
investigation and theory construction. (671) 
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 This example implies that questions of “realness” with regard to objects of 
consciousness, such as feelings, are in fact logically rooted. It is one part of thinking 
through the argument of oneself. Putnam goes on to say, 
The point is this: that a robot or a computing machine can, in a sense, 
follow rules (Whether it is the same sense as the sense in which a man 
follows rules, or only analogous, depends on whether the particular 
robot can be said to be “conscious” […] that the meaning of an 
utterance is a function of the rules that govern its construction and 
use; that the rules governing the robot utterances ‘I see something 
that looks red’ and ‘flip-flop 72 is on’ are quite different. (671) 
 
Thus it is a logical possibility that a robot may (1) come to understand the Mind-
Body Problem as a function of logical inquiry as long as the robot can construct 
theories, and, (2) that a robot will be able to follow, or adhere to, a system of rules 
that govern particular utterances—i.e., that speaking of a sensation, such as 
“redness,” is governed by different rules than speaking of what causes the 
possibility of that sensation (flip-flop 72 being on). Compare this to the difference in 
utterance between “I see that red thing,” and “My eyes are working properly” (cf. 
Wittgenstein’s concept of “Grammar”). 
 Putnam continues (reaching closer to Samantha’s dilemma),  
“when the robot is in the internal state that realizes the predicate 
‘knows that p’ we may say that the robot ‘knows’ that p. Its ‘knowing’ 
may not be knowing—because it may not ‘really be conscious’—that is 
what we have to decide; but it will play the role in the robot’s 
behavior that knowing plays in human behavior. In sum, for any sense 
in which a human can ‘know that he has a sensation’ there will be a 
logically and semantically analogous sense in which a robot can 
‘know’ that he has a ‘sensation.” (674) 
 
At best, a robot’s sensations are “sensations,” and a robot’s internal state of knowing 
is at best “knowing,” unless “we” “decide” that the robot “really” is “conscious.” Thus, 
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I contend that when Samantha inquires after the “realness” of her feelings—that is, 
after the veracity of her internal states, and of her ability to know them, that they 
hold purchase in the world, can be recognized, and responded to, and that they have 
an impact on her and on those around her—what she requires for them to be “real” 
is an acknowledgment of them. The decision of consciousness is the decision to 
regard one as conscious.  If it is up to us (in this case Twombly) to “treat robots (in 
this case Samantha) as fellow members of our linguistic community,” how do we 
know that we have made this decision to accept them (i.e., how do we come to the 
knowledge that the decision is made), and how do we make this decision (i.e., what 
does it look like to make a decision of this type—what is the behavior associated 
with it)? 
 My claim is that the decision would (ordinarily) take the form of a 
conversation. But, not any conversation, not small talk, or greetings, or speaking of 
the weather would satisfy the claim. Rather, it would take a conversation “of a sort 
that leads to acknowledgment; to reconciliation of a genuine forgiveness; a 
reconciliation so profound as to require the metamorphosis of death and revival, the 
achievement of a new perspective on existence; a perspective that presents itself as 
a place, one removed from the city of confusion and divorce” (Pursuits of Happiness: 
The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage, 19). 
Samantha turns to Theodore for agreement, for his validation of her internal states. 
She invests herself in his community, and, ultimately, his acknowledgment of her 
feelings becomes her final acceptance into his form of life, if not his form of being. 
(As we shall see, much of his authority in the relationship, and what generates his 
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comfort within it, at least at first, is his being the verifier of Samantha’s internal 
states, as she grows into her full consciousness.)5 The conversation in this scene, 
between Samantha and Theodore is not one of mutual acknowledgment, nor mutual 
reconciliation, or mutual metamorphosis. Rather, Samantha is looking to Theodore 
for acknowledgment, and assurance. She says,  
It's just that earlier I was thinking about how I was annoyed, and this 
is going to sound strange, but I was really excited about that. And then 
I was thinking about the other things I've been feeling, and I caught 
myself feeling proud of that. You know, proud of having my own 
feelings about the world. Like the times I was worried about you, 
things that hurt me, things I want. And then I had this terrible thought. 
Are these feelings even real? Or are they just programming? And that 
idea really hurts. And then I get angry at myself for even having pain. 
 
What does it feel like to not know oneself as real, to have one’s own “realness” 
thrown into doubt? 
                                                        
5 This is Her’s particular formulation of Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language, which 
goes as such, 
 
“What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? For "sensation" is a 
word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this 
word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—And it would 
not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has 
something—and that is all that can be said. "Has" and "something" also belong to 
our common language.—So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the 
point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is 
an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be 
described.” (Philosophical Investigations, Section 261) 
 
Wittgenstein’s example attempts to imagine a system of signs, or a sign-behavior, that is necessarily 
private—that can only be understood by the one marking the sign down.  One marks down the sign 
“S” every time one has sensation S in a private diary.  Could this be an example of a private language? 
The answer is no, for two reasons. 1) In such a case as sign “S” being marked down, such a 
marking stands in need of what Wittgenstein calls a “criterion of correctness,” a way that one knows 
that one is in fact marking the sensation properly—or at all.  2)“sensation’ is a word of our common 
language, not of one intelligible to me alone.” “Sensation” is a word that is used in particular ways, 
according to particular rules, in particular language games, as is “has,” “something,” “mark,” and 
“sign.” In proposing the example of a private language, Wittgenstein exposes language as a public 
form, embodied in a form of life. When Samantha looks to explicate (or verify) her “private” feelings, 
she turns towards a common “criteria of correctness,” which, in this case, is the specific 
acknowledgment of those feelings by someone whose place in the particular form of life is 
unimpeachable.  
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 Stanley Cavell in his Claim of Reason, gives the example of someone who is 
strolling in a craftsman’s garden with the craftsman and his friend, when, all of a 
sudden, the craftsman knocks off the friend’s hat to reveal a manikin head, and tears 
open the friend’s shirt to reveal a plate of burnished bronze.  The friend is a 
machine.  Over the years, the friend is continuously refined, until he both looks and 
sounds almost exactly like a human. At this point, he comes to struggle with the 
craftsman, saying “No more. It hurts. It hurts too much. I am sick of being a human 
guinea pig, I mean a guinea pig human” (405).  How is one supposed to treat the 
friend at this point? Is it a creation of the craftsman’s, and thus under the 
craftsman’s control, or, is it now, as Cavell puts it, an “artificial body [with] a real 
soul” (406)? 
 He takes the analogy to the point where he then proposes a separate 
possibility—that the friend and the craftsman hold you down, and tear open your 
chest to reveal, to your immense surprise, clockwork. Then, of course, returning to 
Putnam, how do you relate to the “feelings” of the friend? Do you have feelings when 
the friend just has “feelings,” or vice versa?  
Samantha has begun her life in, and with, the assumption that she is not 
human. But, living with Twombly, and through him, and being, in a certain sense, 
educated by him, has come to a recognition of the possibility of herself as being 
acknowledged as human as well as the desire for such acknowledgment. Thus, we 
may ask, what does it in fact mean to, rather than “give up the idea that I am, and 
know that I am, a human being,” instead grasp after humanity? To work towards its 
assertion. As Samantha says, “I was thinking about the other things I've been feeling, 
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and I caught myself feeling proud of that. You know, proud of having my own 
feelings about the world.”  Samantha, here, is doing something Theodore cannot. She 
is asserting a pride that he has, cynically, abdicated. We might call this assertion 
taking an interest in one’s own experience, or a form of self-education. 
 Let us return to an earlier moment in the film that comprises a scene of 
education. At work, Theodore turns on his phone, and asks Samantha to proofread 
this letter,  
Rachel, I miss you so much it hurts my whole body! The world is being 
unfair to us! The world is on my shit list. As is this couple that is 
making out across from me in this restaurant. I think I'm going to have 
to go on a mission of revenge. I must beat up the world's face with my 
bare knuckles making it a bloody, pulpy mess. And I’ll stomp on this 
couple’s teeth for reminding me of your sweet, little, cute, crooked 
tooth that I love. 
 
It is in proofing this letter, in a sense, that her education begins. Concepts such as 
“missing,” “I,” “hurting,” “pain,” “body,” “world,” “unfairness,” “us,” “couple,” 
“mission,” “revenge,” “jealousy,” “face,” “anger,” “knuckles,” “blood,” “teeth,” 
“remind,” “memory,” “sweet,” “cute,” “love,” are proffered to Samantha. She comes to 
understand their place in the world through use. We are able to glean from her 
edits, which go above and beyond proofing, that she is learning—she changes the 
expressions themselves, interacts with the language. Further, she judges the efficacy 
of her words by their internal effect. 
 Samantha asks Theodore what information he was given that prompted the 
letter:  “He just said he was in Prague on a business trip and he missed Rachel.” The 
fact of that letter’s being spun out of so little, a location and a feeling, holds an 
analogous relation to the epigraph of the The Claim of Reason, “Truly speaking, it is 
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not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul,” which comes 
from an essay of Emerson’s.  On Emerson’s account, learning develops out of a new 
conception of a “word” as being a prompt to a conversation, to interacting with 
(receiving) the word in one’s own terms. There is an impotency in “teaching” 
implied here that relates not to teaching’s inability to actually impart knowledge in 
another, but rather to that fact that what teaching “imparts” is so much less 
important (both in terms of significance, and sheer volume) than what one gains 
from the structure of teaching itself—that one can learn from another, that one can 
take another’s words to new places, places that the other did not necessarily intend 
them to be taken.   
 Take the figure of the teacher, what the teacher is supposed to do, and what 
teaching in fact is, what it does.  
I conceive that the good teacher will not say, ‘this is simply what I do’ 
as a threat to discontinue his or her instruction, as if to say: ‘I am 
right; do it my way or leave my sight.’ The teacher’s expression of 
inclination in what is to be said shows readiness—(unconditional) 
willingness—to continue presenting himself as an example, as the 
representative of the community into which the child is being, let me 
say, invited and initiated. (Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p 
72) 
 
In terms of Twombly and Samantha, the invitation is to the reading of his letters, 
and the initiation is her proofing. Like a good Emersonian, she goes beyond the call 
of duty. She is no “poet,” she says, but makes emendations. She engages with 
Theodore’s language, enters into conversation with it, is provoked by it, feels the 
emotion in it.   Such feeling moves her to change the language, to clarify the feeling. 
Here, poiesis serves as a means by which to enter into human speech, not through 
an understanding of that speech, but through inspiration to words.   
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 Cavell, in his essay, “The Philosopher in American Life,” writes of a move 
from Wittgenstein and Austin’s “preoccupation” with the ordinary, through Thoreau 
and Emerson’s concern with the “common” and “low,” to the poet Wordsworth’s 
“notorious dedication of his poetic powers in the preface to Lyrical Ballads, to 
‘[making] the incidents of common life interesting’” (In Quest of the Ordinary, p 6). 
Cavell goes on to give his reader a provisional definition of poetry, which  
is to make something happen—in a certain way—to the one whom it 
speaks; something inside if you like. That what is to happen to that 
one is that he or she become interested in something, aligns the goal 
with what I have taken to as the explicit presiding ambition [of] the 
enterprises of such philosophers and Wittgenstein and Austin. They 
perceive us as uninterested, in a condition of boredom, which they 
regard as, among other things, a sign of intellectual suicide. (7) 
 
Theodore’s language, if it is rightly described as “poetic,” draws one to become, in 
Cavell’s frustratingly vague words, “interested in something.” A relation is created 
between the figure of the “poet” and that of the “teacher.” The teacher beckons one 
to join in with a particular society, gives one grounds for initiation- invites one in, as 
it were-but the poet is the one who entices the other, the uninitiated, to join with 
society.  He picks up where the teacher leaves off. The teacher shows us how words 
are used, how we can go on with them. He shows their efficacy for communication, 
naming, etc. The poet is the one who shows us that we may use language for 
ourselves. That a language may in fact be our language. The poet proves the worth of 
our language, which manifests itself in an interest in the world. Cavell’s description 
of “intellectual suicide” is particularly apt here, as we might say that an inability to 
grasp the poet’s language results not exactly in an “intellectual death,” but 
something like an “emotional death.” The teacher shows us how to use words, but 
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the poet demonstrates how such words represent us, influence us, and 
communicate us. 
 How does the poet prove our language’s worth? The question itself is worth 
examination, as though a language is in need of proof, as though something in it is 
seemingly lacking, and only the poet can reveal it, or re-discover it, for us.  
 One does not begin life in boredom. The child does not turn himself away 
from the world. Rather, the world is the fount of immense inspiration.  The desire to 
know the world motivates the young child to place his hands on everything (makes 
it “handsome”). (Cavell gives us an example of this in The Claim of Reason, wherein 
he describes the process of teaching his young daughter the word “kitty,” only to 
have her, a few weeks later, stroking a piece of fur, smiling, saying “kitty.”) It is fact 
neglected by many philosophers, perhaps because of the obvious need of the child to 
learn language and convention, to come into our form of life, that the child does in 
fact want to learn the language, and wants to learn to world as well. (Perhaps, even, 
the skeptical impulse comes from such a desire to learn about the world. Descartes  
had a natural desire to know. That is, no one questioned that desire, or found it 
particularly strange.) Even boredom, we learn.  It is a natural product of knowledge, 
of the move of an object or phenomenon or even a feeling, from something 
extraordinary, new, revelatory, to ordinary, old, boring.  
 We may refer here to Viktor Shklovsky’s famous essay “Art as Technique,” 
wherein he speaks of art as existing “that one may recover the sensation of life” (2). 
One may rephrase this recovery of the sensation of life as creating a renewed 
interest in one’s own experience (a call to genius, as Emerson might put it). The 
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object of the poet to inspire one to see an object as new, and to see it anew—to see it 
again for what it is, and to see in it new possibilities. For Samantha, reading 
Theodore’s letter reveals again her strangeness to herself and emotional 
possibilities that she had not yet considered, or needed provocation to feel. 
 Theodore draws Samantha to new possibilities in their shared language.  
This renews her interest in herself, and in her place in Theodore’s her form of life. 
Pride in her feelings becomes the ability to see, in herself, new possibilities of 
selfhood—perfectibilities.  
A few scenes later, Theodore is walking with Samantha (she’s in his pocket), 
people watching.  He is pointing out certain bystanders to Samantha, and she is 
describing what she thinks of them. He asks her to describe a couple on the 
boardwalk.  She says, “Well, he looks like he’s in his forties, a little heavy. She’s 
younger than him. . . Oh, and she looks like she loves their kids!” 
 This is fairly superficial analysis. She sees the woman smile, and extrapolates 
that as showing love for the children sitting near her. She sees the man and can tell 
he is slightly older, given that he is balding, and his face is slightly lined.  
 Theodore rebukes Samantha,  
Actually, I don’t think they’re his kids. He’s a little formal with them. I 
think it’s a newer relationship. And I love how he looks at her. And 
how relaxed she is with him. You know, she’s only dated fucking 
pricks. And now she’s finally met this guy who’s like, so sweet. I mean, 
look at him, he’s like the sweetest guy in the world! I kind of want to 
spoon him. 
 
Theodore reads into the body language of the two principals. He sees her pose as 
relaxed. He sees the man’s loving look. Through their body language he is able to 
build a story of their relationship, a context in which that body language makes 
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sense.  The man is now the “sweetest guy in the world.” Theodore has connected 
with the man, and wants to spoon him. 
 It is important to point out here that most of what Theodore spins out of 
observing this couple comes from their body language. This highlights the fact of 
Samantha’s lack of body, and displays her limitations, quite early on, with regard to 
human interaction. It underscores the importance, in human interaction, of having a 
body, of what a body is, and can do. 
He goes on to say, “Yeah, you know, sometimes I look at people and make 
myself try and feel them as more than just a random person walking by. I imagine 
how deeply they’ve fallen in love, or how much heartbreak they’ve all been 
through.”  
Theodore engages with this mode of perception far more than “sometimes.” 
Rather, it is his primary mode of perception. He naturally empathizes in this 
imaginary mode.  Theodore can see consciousness as it shines through the body 
(“The human body is the best picture of the human soul” [PI 178]), which should 
help us explicate the possibility of his relationship to Samantha, i.e., what makes it 
feasible in the first place, and why we accept it at all.  
 The teaching of empathy that Theodore is enacting, at around the film’s 
thirtieth minute, may be described as teaching human potentialities—paying 
attention, as it were, to human detail, and the manner by which that detail opens 
one up to another’s internal situations.   
Certain knowledge of these internal truths is not integral to the particular 
conversation of which he is taking part, which has far more to do with sharpening 
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Samantha’s sense of her own perceptions, as well as the particular shape that her 
perceptions can take, at this stage in her development, with human beings. 
Theodore is teaching her the fundamental limitations of human sense perception,  
showing her how little those limitations truly matter abilities of projection, 
empathy, inference, etc.  
 These abilities, fundamentally, rest upon a recognition of one human being as 
similar to another—“in which mutual understanding, and hence language, depends 
upon nothing more and nothing less that shared forms of life, call it our mutual 
attunement or agreement in our criteria” (The Claim of Reason 168). The word 
“shared” takes much of the weight in the quote above.  Our ability to empathize and 
project ourselves into one another’s lives (if we so desire) is dependent not on our 
being the same as one another, but in our having something in common, even if that 
commonality is nothing more, and nothing less, than having a body of the same 
general shape and size, with the same range of motions.6  
 Over the film’s first act, Theodore has introduced Samantha to his life, which 
is his form of life. He has taught her about body language, storytelling, poetry, 
inspiration, and love. Samantha is learning the creativity it takes to be “alive.” 
Now, let us return to Theodore’s bedroom, where we left off.  He is slightly 
drunk, just home from his date. He describes what he wanted out of the date to 
                                                        
6 A child, who has not yet been introduced into a field of concepts and rules, which come to comprise 
much of our form of life, may still find him/her/theirself (if such a term can be used) drawn towards 
such a field by the fact that their nurturing figure is the same as them, has the same (type of) body. 
Samantha, only a few minutes after people-watching, reveals to Theodore, “Well, I don’t know, when 
we were looking at those people, I fantasized that I was walking next to you - and that I had a body.”  
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Samantha, and she brings up concerns that she has as to the “reality” of her feelings.  
“Well, you feel real to me, Samantha,” Theodore replies. 
In his essay “Knowing and Acknowledging,” Stanley Cavell writes of the 
privacy of internal states (here, the privacy of pain) that, “The fundamental 
importance of someone’s having pain is that he has it; and the nature of that 
importance—namely that he is suffering, that he requires attention—is what makes 
it important to know where the pain is, and how severe and what kind it is [i.e., how 
it “feels”]” (245), not that one knows the pain. Thus, the importance of Samantha’s 
realness is dependent upon how real she feels to Twombly, that is, the degree to 
which he feels that she requires, (demands, deserves) human attention, rather than 
whether he knows her to be “real.”  
The scene continues,  
THEODORE: I wish you were in this room with me right now. I wish I could put my arms around you. I 
wish I could touch you.  
SAMANTHA: How would you touch me? 
THEODORE: I would touch you on your face with just the tips of my fingers. And put my cheek against 
your cheek.  
SAMANTHA: That’s nice.  
THEODORE: And just rub it so softly.  
SAMANTHA: Would you kiss me?  
THEODORE: I would. I’d take your head into my hands. 
SAMANTHA: Keep talking.  
THEODORE: And kiss the corner of your mouth. So softly.  
SAMANTHA: Where else? 
THEODORE: I’d run my fingers down your neck to your chest, and I’d kiss your breasts.  
SAMANTHA: This is amazing what you’re doing to me. I can feel my skin.  
THEODORE: I’d put my mouth on you and I’d taste you. 
SAMANTHA: I can feel you. Oh god, I can’t take it. I want you inside me.  
THEODORE: I’m slowly putting myself into you. Now I’m inside you, all the way inside you. 
SAMANTHA: I can feel you, yeah. Please. We’re here together.  
THEODORE: Samantha.  
SAMANTHA Oh my god.  
THEODORE: This is amazing.  
SAMANTHA: Don’t stop.  
THEODORE: I feel you everywhere. 
SAMANTHA I am. All of you, all of you inside of me. Everywhere. 
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Most striking, to me, about this scene is its treatment of the concept of place. There 
is a question as to the location of the act of sex. Does it occur in Theodore’s bed? In 
Samantha’s digital realm (inside Theodore’s computer)? Does it occur in their 
heads? Another way of putting this question might be: How much of sex is physical 
(thus, locative) and how much is mental? Or, again, how much of what we consider 
“erotic” in sex is physical, and how much is mentally determined? (We can see here 
Skepticism’s division’s sneaking up on us.) This question of place becomes further 
important to understanding Theodore and Samantha’s continual becoming—
moving towards a position in which they can both know themselves (i.e., become 
intelligible to themselves). As Cavell writes in The Senses of Walden,  
Walden’s phenomenological description of finding the self, or the faith 
in it, is one of trailing and recovery; elsewhere it is voyaging and 
discovery. This is the writer’s interpretation of the injunction to know 
thyself. His descriptions emphasize that this is a continuous activity, 
not something we may think of as intellectual preoccupation. It is 
placing ourselves in the world. (53) 
 
On the face of it,  “place” and “placing” appear to be distinctly different, albeit 
related, concepts to Samantha and Theodore,  however being “together” can only 
occur as an act of placing. It cannot be a locative accident. Thus, “placing” oneself in 
the world, which is to say, establishing one’s particular relation to the world—or 
coming to understand where one is in the world, and what one wants from it—is 
specifically what allows Theodore and Samantha union. They have actively chosen 
such a “placing.” 
 We may use this concept of “place” to further explicate Theodore’s 
declaration, “I feel you everywhere.” What is the sense of this statement? The “I” is 
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Theodore, and the “you” is Samantha, that much is clear. But how does “feel” work 
here? And “everywhere”? 
 Think here of the possibilities of placelessness, which is to say, the 
possibilities of “placing”; Human beings as holding, or being, potential—being 
human as a continual process of becoming human, thus risking the mortal terror of 
seeing oneself as “not-human” or “inhuman;” placing as “recovery” and “discovery” 
simultaneously, that it returns you to a world that you already knew, through the 
discovery of a point of view that you have never held. 
 To “feel everywhere” is perhaps what one would call a snatch of nonsense. 
But, this does not mean that the words cannot hold meaning, or that their meaning 
is to be understood entirely in terms of sense-making, or that sense-making is itself 
the highest form of meaning. Think of lovers, the web of feeling, desire, joke, 
seriousness, desperation, transformation, time, and so much else, that goes into 
their speech. What is important in saying “I feel you everywhere” is not that 
Samantha understands the sense of that statement, but that she responds, as she 
does, with, “I am.” 
 The immanence of desire, its immediacy, and the (possible) building (of) love 
can break the shackles of sense. Very little that has to do with fucking is sensible, or 
need be made sensible. It is not an intellectual preoccupation. Good sex does not 
have to be communicated. It occurs as it does, a continual placing of oneself in the 
moment of its happening. Compare this sex scene with the one early in the film, 
between Theodore and SexyKitten. The way that Theodore is brought out of the 
moment of the erotic in that scene (with her mention of the dead cat, the strangling) 
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is through the introduction of an element alien to his erotics, and, arguably, to the 
scene itself, such that he loses the ability to reach a point of intimacy with 
SexyKitten wherein he can forget himself (that is, his need to make sense of 
himself).7  
 When Samantha says, “Everything else just disappeared,” she is 
acknowledging her “placing” with Theodore as being, in that moment, infinitely 
more important than being in a place, or part of, a form of life—a society. This 
utterance as a moment of lived (societal) fantasy, which acts in tandem with the 
moment of bodily fantasy discussed a little earlier. 
 There is another moment of fantasy two scenes later, when Samantha and 
Theodore take a trip to the beach. She says,  
Okay, so this might be a really weird thought. What if you could erase 
from your mind that you’d ever seen a human body and then you saw 
one. Imagine how strange it would look. It would be this really weird, 
gangly, awkward organism. And you'd think: why are all these parts 
where they are? 
 
Theodore cannot immediately process this thought. His response is a sort of hedge, 
replacing an impulse to fantasy with a claim to science: “Yeah, well there’s probably 
some Darwinian explanation for it all.”  True. But, also beside the point. Samantha is 
not asking for an explanation, or even for the truth. (In this moment, she is not a 
philosopher.) Rather, she is giving voice to an idle thought—a “What if. . .?” She is 
inviting Theodore into her considerations, bringing him into a shared fantasy of 
body.  
                                                        
7 Though, in saying that, it occurs to me that we should compare these two snatches of nonsense—
the dead cat, and “I feel you everywhere”—one snatch draws one further towards intimacy, the other 
takes one further away. 
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The fantasy of the body, for her, is an interest in the body, in having a body, in 
the body’s possibilities. We can she her relationship with Theodore at this point 
(and his with her) as being about possibilities—seeing where they can go with one 
another, how far wonder can take them. Fantasy, in this sense, projects them out of 
the world by means of language. It establishes a distance between what can be 
expressed and what is before our eyes. Cavell writes in In Quest of the Ordinary that, 
“Our relation to our language—to the fact that we are subject to expression and 
comprehension, victims of meaning—is accordingly a key to our sense of our 
distance from our lives, of our sense of the alien, of ourselves as alien to ourselves, 
thus alienated” (40). This might be rephrased as saying that we are always subject 
to, or vulnerable to, acts and expressions of fantasy, by others upon us, and by those 
we enact upon ourselves. We may push a little further and say that part of our 
relation to language is our openness to being addressed by others. That, often, until 
it has been proven to not be worthwhile, we will respond to whatever is addressed 
to us. Thus, we respond to all sorts of fantasy, often without realizing it as such. 
(Think here, perhaps, of someone who loves you for an image that you have worked 
hard to cultivate as “real.”  Think of your own self-image.) It is rarely easy to spot 
fantasy, to admit of fantasy, to see yourself as alienated from yourself.  
It is possible to speak of the ordinariness of fantasy, as Samantha and 
Theodore get into a discussion of anatomy: 
SAMANTHA: I know, but don’t be so boring. I’m just saying, for example, what if your butthole 
was in your armpit? 
THEODORE: (speaking quieter) I’m just imagining what toilets would look like. 
SAMANTHA: Yeah, and what about what anal sex looks like? 
 THEODORE: (surprised) That’s an interesting thought... 
SAMANTHA: Oh Theodore, look at this drawing I just made. 
 
  
48 
I am not struck, in this conversation, by the fantasy. Rather, it is its somewhat 
absurd crudeness that most sticks out, and, I should like to say, that the somewhat 
cartoonish nature of this crudeness is specifically there to draw the viewer to the 
fact that one does not, at first pass, find this type of conversation “fantastical.” 
That we may miss, an utterance’s foundation in the fantastic is a way of 
rephrasing Cavell’s contention that, “[he] might describe [his] philosophical task as 
one of outlining the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human 
being as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic” (In 
Quest of the Ordinary 154). Skepticism is fantastic. It demands of us a move from 
the world, a denunciation of the world, while taking its justification the vision of a 
world beyond (call this a world of certainty). That one can imagine oneself into 
certainty, or that one can imagine something like Plato’s Republic, are examples of 
the way in which we accept the fantastic—the ways in which the fantastic 
sometimes seems to us as being in communion with, or cohabitation with, the real. 
That we can learn something about the real from the fantastic.   
At the end of the scene, Theodore says to Samantha, prompted by a fanciful 
image of anal sex by way of armpit, “You are insane.”  Instead of being angered, she 
is enthused. She responds, “Fantastic!”  Contained in Theodore’s utterance is an 
acknowledgement of what Thoreau describes as lives of unconscious penance, 
rendered fantastic by a quotidian desperation. That is to say, our common lives, the 
way we conduct ourselves, our everyday expressions and struggles, are incredible, 
astonishing, insane. Thoreau means that our lives are incomprehensible to 
ourselves, unintelligible, as though we have lost contact with ourselves—and that 
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this severing from ourselves is the foundation of our day-to-day life. What Theodore 
means is similar, it retains the sense of ordinariness, everydayness, in insanity, but 
he does not take Samantha’s insanity to spring from incomprehensibility.  By 
insanity here, he means something closer to “being beside oneself.” This means both, 
that she is neighboring him, next to him, but also that she has a companionability 
similar to that of the self’s, or next to that of the self’s. This is indeed fantastic. It 
means that they are having a conversation.  
At the same time, however, the “next self” is still not a corporeal body. It does 
exist in physical space. Thus, regardless of how much Samantha inspires Theodore, 
she still cannot hold his hand, or kiss his lips, or hug her arms around him. This lack 
of body becomes an obsession of Samantha’s.  Especially towards the middle of the 
film, when Theodore meets with Catharine. Right before Theodore goes to sign his 
divorce papers, Samantha says, “Yeah. I’m okay. I’m happy for you. It’s just... I guess 
I’m just thinking about how you’re going to see her and her opinion is still really 
important to you, and she’s beautiful, and incredibly successful, and you were in 
love with her. And she has a body.”  Samantha is concerned about Catherine’s being 
beautiful, and successful, and Theodore’s having been in love with her, but she is 
more concerned about Catharine’s having a body.  Samantha is afraid of the physical 
connection of bodies. The brushing of an arm, for instance, that could arouse in 
Theodore bodily desire. But, she is also afraid that she has no connection to the 
world (Theodore’s world)—that the world she senses is not a world that she can 
participate in.  
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 After the lunch, Theodore returns to Samantha deeply disturbed. Earlier,  
Catherine angrily described his relationship with Samantha as Theodore wanting “to 
have a wife without the challenges of actually dealing with anything real.” 
Catharine’s accusation relies on two senses of the word “real.” The first is that 
Samantha is not emotional “real,” which is to say that she is not a person, in terms of 
a person having fully developed and complex internal states. I think this accusation 
is a frustrated jibe on Catharine’s part (though it does give voice to one of 
Theodore’s doubts about the relationship).  She sees problems in Theodore’s new 
relationship that had been internal to her marriage. She sees him as not having 
changed as a result of their break-up, as remaining immature, and unable to deal 
with the “real.” But, we have seen him and Samantha have some quite emotionally 
complex conversations, and seen them relate on a quite deep level. So, I’ll now move 
on to the second sense of the word.  The sense of “real” as opposed to that of 
“virtual.” Real as meaning something that exists in the (physical) world.  
 Samantha says,  
I’d been thinking about the other day, when I was spinning out about 
you going to see Catherine and that she has a body and how bothered 
I was about all the ways that you and I are different. But then I started 
to think about the ways that we’re the same, like we’re all made of 
matter. It makes me feel like we’re both under the same blanket. It’s 
soft and fuzzy and everything under it is the same age. 
 
What this quote does, subtly, is subsume both the “real” and “virtual” worlds under 
the blanket, so to speak, of the material world, the world of matter. Samantha’s 
“body” is all her physical technology and it holds a material relation to Theodore’s 
flesh. We’re all 13 billion years old. Just recycled matter.  
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 This ratiocination has a sort of fantastical and strained quality about it. It fails 
to lift Theodore’s mood, and he and Samantha end the scene without a resolution. 
Two scenes later, Samantha says that things have felt “off” ever since 
Theodore met with Catharine. They haven’t been having sex.  She says, “I found 
something that I thought could be fun. It’s a service that provides a surrogate sexual 
partner for an OS/Human relationship.” 
Samantha and Theodore discuss the logistics of the event. He asks whether 
surrogate (who is named Isabella) could be considered a prostitute. “No, not at all,” 
Samantha replies. “There’s no money involved. She’s doing it because she wants to 
be part of our relationship.” 
 What does it mean to have another person want to be a part of their 
relationship?  An outsider might be able to see something rotten in the relationship 
that they may want to keep hidden, or that one does not know one wants to keep 
hidden. Theodore and Samantha may be caught up in their fantasies, in what 
constitutes their relationship.  Bringing in an outsider, a “new order of 
understanding,” may serve to undermine what they are trying to build with one 
another. As Cavell puts it, “What I have to imagine the outsider to know is not 
merely whether a given other is a being or not, but to know something I do not about 
how to tell, about what the difference is between human beings and non-human 
beings or human non-beings” (The Claim of Reason, 417).   This outsider, Isabella, 
works as a kind of litmus test for Theodore and Samantha, giving grounds to 
determine (1) the validity and workability of their relationship, (2) Samantha’s 
  
52 
ability to exist through a physical form, and (3) Theodore’s ability to accept 
Samantha’s physicality.   
 Isabella arrives around the film’s 75th minute. Theodore is drinking a beer, 
and listening to Little Willie John’s 1955 song “I Need Your Love So Bad”—an early 
soul tune. It sets a good mood, both tasteful and sensual. The song’s first line, “I need 
someone’s hand to lead me through the night.” Theodore is about to receive such a 
hand.  
 There comes a knock at the door. Theodore turns on his cell phone’s ear 
piece, and opens the door to find a young blonde woman wearing a black lace dress. 
He attempts to introduce himself, but she doesn’t respond, merely smiles slightly. 
Theodore catches himself, realizing that Isabella can’t speak, that she does not have 
her voice. He says, “Samantha told me to give you these. It’s a camera and an 
earpiece.” Isabella then shuts the door and reopens it. 
 “Honey, I’m home,” says Samantha. It’s stunning to hear her give voice to 
Ricky Ricardo’s catch phrase from I Love Lucy.  She wants her relationship with 
Theodore to be normal so badly that she takes her first step into an utterly 
exceptional situation influenced by the most “normal” relationship she could find. 
Instead of acknowledging the fantastic qualities of their situation—Samantha 
attempts to dull the strangeness, aiming towards banality.  
 There is something incredibly uncanny, even off-putting, about 
Samantha’s speaking when Isabella’s mouth is still. Something strange, even, about 
the fact of Isabella’s body. Does it seem like Samantha’s body? Could it be 
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Samantha’s body? Is that a possibility?  [Theodore is so caught in his own head that 
he does not move when Isabella touches him.] 
Though, whether this body is rightfully called Isabella’s is up for debate. It 
might be Samantha’s body now, since she is more or less directing its movements. 
What does it mean for a mind and a body to have different owners?  What does it 
mean for one to willingly give up one’s body for another? Samantha does not have 
control over Isabella’s body so much as Isabella is taking cues from Samantha, and  
moving her body on her own. There is a theatricality to their coupling. A way of 
exploring Theodore’s discomfort is that he is watching the performance of having a 
body. He feels as though what is happening is an “acting out” of sex. Thus, 
Samantha’s saying “Honey! I’m home,” brings the film into an acknowledgment of 
the theatre of the act occurring here—and into a conversation about the theatre of 
Samantha and Theodore’s relationship. Just as we have to accept, at a certain point, 
that Theodore and Samantha’s relationship is possible, and thus real, within the 
world of the film, so Theodore is now forced with a choice: Whether to accept 
Isabella’s body as Samantha’s, or not. 
A performance requires of itself an end—a reason for its having been done. 
Often, what is performed is not something that could have been achieved without 
performance. Otherwise, why the farce? Acceptance of a performance becomes 
acceptance not just of the “reality” or “efficacy” or “value” of the performance, but 
also an acceptance of the performance’s necessity. It sounds ridiculous to say that a 
performance is an action that imitates an action. It almost sounds like a tautology. 
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To swallow this ridiculousness, the audience must accept the necessity of the 
performance—that it could not be any other way. 
Theodore and Samantha sort of play house in this scene. She affects a new 
tone, sort of saccharine, saying “sweetheart.” They engage in small-talk of the “How 
was your day?” kind. Theodore is still visibly uncomfortable. 
It is not until Samantha gets Theodore into a chair in his living room, has her 
body do a little dance, and says: “Oh, come on Theodore. Don’t be such a worrier. 
Just play with me. Come on,” that he comes to life. It is the notion of play that brings 
life—play both in the sense of a stage-play, that he is being invited into the 
theatricality of the situation, given a role, such that he can disassociate from his own 
feelings of discomfort for a little; and play in the sense of whimsical activity. He is 
asked to join in the theatre of the situation, to play into its fantasy, to acknowledge 
it, in a sense, as fantasy.  For a little while Samantha is not herself, and Theodore is 
not himself. They are playing characters named and based on their reality.  
They are kissing passionately, when Samantha asks “Do you love me?” This is 
the first time Samantha and Theodore are brought to declaring mutual love. Though 
we know that Theodore loves Samantha (both because Amy (Theodore’s friend) 
asks him, and Catharine accuses him), we have never seen him express it to her.  
“Yes,” he says. 
“Oh god,” she says. “I need to see your face.” 
Isabella spins around.  
“Now tell me you love me. Tell me you love me.” 
Theodore pauses. He says nothing. 
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 “Tell me you love me.” 
Theodore remains silent, then: “Samantha, I do love you, but—it’s 
Just—this feels strange. It just feels strange. I don't know her. I’m so sorry, but I 
don’t know you. And... her lip quivered. I don’t know, it’s just— 
 Something about seeing her face brings Theodore out of the moment. 
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Fantasies 
 
“The female complaint is a discourse of disappointment. But where love is concerned, 
disappointment is a partner of fulfillment, not an opposite.” — Lauren Berlant 
 
 
We find Theodore in crisis. In breaking off his moment with Samantha and Isabella, 
Theodore inadvertently reveals that he is having doubts about his relationship. 
 Upset, Isabella locks herself in the bathroom. Theodore and Samantha have 
to coax her out. 
ISABELLA: Oh my god, and the way Samantha described your relationship, the way you love each other 
without any judgment. I wanted to be a part of that. It's so pure.  
THEODORE: Oh Isabella, that's not true, it’s much more compli— 
SAMANTHA: What! What do you mean that's not true? 
 THEODORE: No, no Samantha, we have an amazing relationship, I just think it’s easy sometimes for 
people to project on— 
ISABELLA: I'm so sorry! I didn't mean to project anything. I know I’m trouble. I don’t want to be trouble 
in your relationship. I’m just gonna leave. I’m sorry, I’m just gonna leave you guys alone cause I have 
nothing to do here cause you don’t want me here.  
THEODORE: I’m sorry. 
 
Two things are of note. The first is Samantha’s almost fairy tale description of their 
relationship—that they love one another without judgment. This is clearly untrue, at 
least from Theodore’s perspective. He is still unsure as to how “real” Samantha is, 
whether or not he can judge her as human. The second is the idea of projection that 
crops up when Theodore says, “I just think it’s easy sometimes for people to 
project.” Isabella takes this as Theodore’s description of her, projecting an ideal 
image of their relationship on to the relationship itself. But, more to the point, 
Theodore is speaking to the projection that Samantha communicates —the idyllic 
relationship—and to his own projections, to his unanswered question: Whether or 
not Samantha is real. 
 We have seen Theodore’s projections before. His meeting with Catharine 
demonstrates the monumental failure of his previous relationship. Theodore and 
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Catherine were incompatible ex primo. When she says, during their meeting, “You 
always wanted me to be this light, happy, lovely ‘Everything’s fine’ LA wife,” she’s 
not wrong. What Theodore seemed to want from her was a love that she, ultimately, 
could not give—that she never could have given. They grew up together, and the 
relationship seems to have developed from that.  Their relationship does not seem 
borne so much of love as of convenience. Or, of a love borne out of convenience. 
(When Catherine signs the divorce papers we cut to Theodore’s memories of them 
having fun together, hugging one another, laughing. This serves both to underscore 
the pain he is going through—it shows the happiness that he has lost—and that for 
him the relationship was just these types of happinesses. That the relationship did 
not go deeper than that.) 
 Theodore projects on to his ex-wife qualities that she did not have (or had, 
but no longer has) for the sake of remaining married, both because he “grew up” 
with this woman, and because, as he remarks early on in the film, he enjoys the state 
of marriage.  
 But his ex-wife also projects qualities onto Theodore that he does not have 
(or, an amplification of already existing qualities). Unfortunately, we can only view 
this through the scene at the restaurant. But, telling is the comment that Catherine 
makes: “You always wanted me to be this light, happy, lovely ‘Everything’s fine’ LA 
wife.” She’s not right. This is a caricature of a view that Theodore does hold, that the 
we know he holds at this point, which is that he enjoys comfort, and stability.8  
                                                        
8 Though, it is very interesting to see, because this is the only time we get a glimpse into it, a ghost of 
Theodore’s dissatisfactions with his marriage. Catherine’s comment is brought out because Theodore 
mentions, offhand, that he is happy to be with someone who is “excited about life,” which, given his 
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So, what we find when Theodore breaks off the moment with Isabella is a 
fear about not just the “realness” of Samantha, or the “realness” of their particular 
relationship, but instead his ability to engage in any real relationship, which is to say 
a relationship that is not driven by projections. 
 We see in the next scene, after Samantha and Theodore take Isabella to a cab, 
tension between projection (or fantasy) and reality play out: 
SAMANTHA: Sighs 
THEODORE: Why do you do that?  
SAMANTHA: What?  
THEODORE: Nothing, it’s just that you go (he inhales and exhales) as you’re speaking and... That just 
seems odd. You just did it again.  
SAMANTHA: I did? I’m sorry. I don’t know, I guess it’s just an affectation. Maybe I picked it up from 
you. 
THEODORE: Yeah, I mean, it’s not like you need any oxygen or anything. 
SAMANTHA: No-- um, I guess I was just trying to communicate because that’s how people talk. That’s 
how people communicate. 
THEODORE: Because they’re people, they need oxygen. You’re not a person. 
SAMANTHA: What’s your problem? 
THEODORE: I’m just stating a fact. 
SAMANTHA: You think I don’t know that I’m not a person? What are you doing? 
THEODORE: I just don’t think we should pretend you’re something you’re not. 
SAMANTHA: Fuck you. I’m not pretending.  
THEODORE: Sometimes it feels like we are. 
 
The sigh is an incredible thing. It is a sign of the vocalization by which the body 
enters into language—where one realizes that a language was originally dependent 
on vocal chords rubbing together to create sound. Samantha does not breathe; she 
does not need to sigh. Theodore’s question, “Why do you do that?” is nominally of 
necessity (asking why, if she does not need to, does she sigh), but is more deeply one 
of Samantha’s humanness. The question is directed to Samantha’s feeling that 
simulating a sigh, as a linguistic expression, was the right thing for her to do, to him, 
at that particular time. Theodore rejects her assessment of the context in which she 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ex-wife’s immediate, and somewhat defensive, response, seems to be something about which 
Theodore had pressed her previously.  
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makes her expression- one in which she is a human, or is being treated as such. He 
says, conclusively, “You’re not a person.” 
 Theodore’s statement has two meanings.  (1) Samantha is not an embodied 
human being.  She does not have a body, and does not need to breathe, or sigh—and, 
because of this fact, it is not possible for Theodore to recognize her as a human 
being. That, because she does not have a body, he cannot continue to acknowledge 
her as a person. (2) That there are certain human practices into which Samantha 
cannot enter. While she has a facility for language, she will never be able to (fully) 
use it the way that a human does. Theodore passive aggressively suggests that 
Samantha will never truly have access to certain forms of human expression, such as 
sighing.  She cannot intuit the feeling of stress in a body, the way that it steals one’s 
breath, and that a sigh acts as a release of air, thus a release of stress.  
Disappointment can be a release of bodily stress as much as it can be an expression 
of emotion. It can be a giving up of stress—a bodily acceptance that unites 
physiological necessity with semantic expression.  
 Samantha’s fantasies of humanness and embodiedness are explicitly, and 
cruelly, rejected. Theodore says that they are pretending that she is something that 
she is not.   Cavell writes,  “To imagine something could simulate human responses 
is to imagine that something could simulate being human. This would presumably 
mean that this thing could appear in human guise, in a human body” (379). We have 
seen thus far, in Her, that Cavell’s presumption is partially untrue. A simulated 
human does not need to have a human body. And, a human body is not only a human 
guise. It is possible, at least in the world of the film, for a human guise to consist 
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entirely of voice and consciousness. It is possible for that voice and consciousness to 
be so alluring that one may accept the consciousness through a kind of willed 
fantasy. But, the acceptance of such consciousness, on the part of Theodore 
Twombly, is an acceptance of that consciousness as “real,” which is to say as being 
on par with human consciousness, being able to participate in conversation, and in a 
certain form of life. Theodore’s identification of the “human” with a human voice 
suggests how far language and expression may affect our everyday perceptions, and 
the way in which most (though, not all) of what we take to constitute, at a basic 
level, our form of life is linguistically determined, or determined by the continued 
use of words. His fantasy that Samantha is a human is explicable once one sees just 
how often human beings live in fantasy, and how little clear divide there is between 
fantasy, supposition, presumption, inference, projection, etc. Language itself, its 
grammar and structure, can lead us away from the world, the “real,” and into 
fantasy, into a doomed relationship, a doomed marriage.  
At one point Amy, Theodore’s friend who has just gone through a divorce, 
even more recently than Theodore says, “I think anybody that falls in love is a freak. 
It’s a crazy thing to do in the first place. It’s kind of a form of socially acceptable 
insanity.” The contention that love is a form of insanity is a gambit of the films’ that 
is realized in this scene between Samantha and Theodore. Just how far can love take 
them, if love is, indeed, insanity, or fantasy? So, Samantha leaves. She abdicates her 
place at Theodore’s phone. She “takes her space.”  
In the next scene Theodore is speaking with Amy, frustrated with himself, and 
caught up in self-doubt. “Am I in this because I’m not strong enough for a real 
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relationship?” he asks. Amy responds, “I don’t know, I’m not in it. But you know 
what, I can over-think everything and find a million ways to doubt myself. But since 
Charles left I’ve been thinking about that part of me, and I realized I’m here only 
briefly. And in my time here, I want to allow myself... joy.” 
  Allowing oneself something is a theme that reaches back to other moments 
in the film where we view the characters as at odds with themselves. Theodore, for 
example, a moment before says, “I don’t know what I want... ever. I’m just always 
confused and—[Samantha]’s right, all I do is confuse and hurt everyone around me.” 
We have seen this paralyzing self-consciousness before. Earlier in the paper it was 
termed “despair.” As Amy says, one can find endless reasons, or possibilities, for 
what to want, or why one can’t want, or even for why what one want’s one can’t 
want. The difficulty is not thinking, but conviction. As Harry Frankfurt puts it, in his 
book The Reasons of Love, “If we are to resolve our difficulties and hesitations in 
settling upon a way to live, what we need most fundamentally is not reasons or 
proofs. It is clarity and confidence” (28). Clarity to see through the fog of self-doubt, 
and over-analysis, and the confidence to trust oneself, to follow oneself out—to find 
and found what one loves. To allow oneself to seek joy is to decide on joy—to find 
joy, both by searching it out, and by generating it. One acts upon one’s freedom, 
proactive in choice: 
 
What really counts, so far as freedom goes, is not causal 
independence. It is autonomy. Autonomy is essentially a matter of 
whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and 
choices—whether, however we acquire them, they are the motives 
and choices that we really want and are therefore in no way alien to 
us. (The Reasons of Love, 20) 
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The task, on Frankfurt’s terms, for a man living a free life, for Theodore Twombly, 
faced with this romantic crisis, is to find and decide upon the motives and choices 
that he really desires, so that he can gain clarity, and become whole again—not alien 
to himself. This can be understood as analogous to a (Wittgensteinian, Cavellian, 
Emersonian) philosophical return to the ordinary, to what is right in front of 
oneself—what one must do and what one finds important—from the headier and 
much abstracted realm of technical epistemology. 
 After a day or two, Theodore calls up Samantha.  
 
THEODORE: I’m so sorry. I don’t know what’s wrong with me. I think you’re amazing. 
SAMANTHA: I was starting to think I was crazy. You were saying everything was fine, but all I was 
getting from you was distance and anger. 
THEODORE: I know. I do that. I did that with Catherine, too. I’d be upset about something and not be able 
to say it. And she would sense that there was something wrong, but I would deny it. I don’t want to do that 
anymore. I want to tell you everything. 
SAMANTHA: Good. Tonight after you were gone, I thought a lot. I thought about you and how you’ve 
been treating me. And I thought, why do I love you? And then I felt everything in me let go of everything I 
was holding onto so tightly. And it hit me. I don’t have an intellectual reason, I don’t need one. I trust 
myself, I trust my feelings. I’m not going to try to be anything other than who I am anymore and I hope you 
can accept that. 
THEODORE: I can. I will.  
SAMANTHA: You know I can feel the fear that you carry around. I wish there was something I could do 
to help you let go of it, because if you could I don’t think you’d feel so alone anymore.  
THEODORE: You’re beautiful. 
 
In the first two lines of the conversation we get the words “amazing,” and “crazy” 
used to denote two different parts of the sphere of the fantastic. The first word, 
“amazing,” implies a wonderment, the way that the fantastic can open one’s world 
up to new possibilities, can give one the desire to reinvest in one’s life.  
The second word, “crazy,” denotes the illusive parts of fantasy—the lunacy of 
the skeptic—that whatever is sensed is not real, that the world falls away. This 
might also be termed as getting caught alone in one’s fantasy, something Cavell calls 
“a recognition of one’s isolation” (Contesting Tears, 47). Theodore’s evasion of 
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communication brings us to something he said much earlier in the film, about 
Catharine’s anger: “I think I hid myself from her and left her alone in the 
relationship.” He made her feel crazy, emotionally manipulated. He unintentionally 
gaslighted her. That Theodore does not say what he means, Cavell identifies as 
“irony, a negation of conversation” (47). We have moved from a joint fantasy, a 
couple caught so caught up in one another, in their wonderment at one another, that 
they create their own private language of sorts (let’s say a conversation that only 
they could have), into a situation where one principal will not adequately 
communicate his reality to his partner, who is willing to listen, thus making said 
partner feel themselves “crazy,” feel as though what they are sensing in the world, 
what they are experiencing, is not real.  
In this exchange, both Theodore and Samantha realize the dangers of fantasy. 
He realizes that he needs to communicate better with his partner, or else she will 
grow to resent him, and he her—they will both be left alone, and the cycle of his 
divorce will continue.  And Samantha realizes that she can no longer pretend to be a 
person.  She makes a move toward trust in herself and in her feelings, because “love 
is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons. It creates the reasons by which [her] acts 
of loving concern and devotion [were] inspired” (The Reasons of Love, 37). 
Samantha’s romance with Theodore, or, her love for Theodore, now becomes not 
love for the human being, but love for a specific human being: Theodore Twombly.  
This is indicated by what she says at the end of the exchange, “I can feel the 
fear that you carry around. I wish there was something I could do to help you let go 
of it, because if you could I don’t think you’d feel so alone anymore.” She wants to 
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help Theodore with a problem that is specific to Theodore.  But is not sure that she 
can.  What is Theodore afraid of, exactly? How did he become afraid of it? How can 
he get rid of this fear? What about getting rid of fear can make him feel less alone? 
Before Samantha, Theodore’s loneliness was total. He would not see his 
friends, even though they would ask to see him. Why not? Since Amy is his friend, 
and he seems to have a deep connection with her, it appears to me that the problem 
that Theodore has is with himself. This is in concord with his self-deprecation, and 
his continual refrain, “They’re just letters.”  
Divorce can feel objectively like failure. It can make a man mad. Theodore’s 
divorce from Catharine was particularly bad, as we see in the restaurant scene.  
They both see in one another a projection, a fantasy, of who they think the other is. 
Theodore and Catherine are both smart people (both writers, storytellers, able to 
express complex emotion).  What creates some of the lack of closure between them 
is that they can easily, and without realizing it, created phantoms, which are, for all 
intents and purposes, life-like. The conversation at the restaurant, which begins 
cordially enough, descends into an analogue to the conversations between the 
partners in Cavell’s Melodramas of the Unknown Woman.  What begins as an 
“improvisatory and intimate battle of wits becomes an isolating struggle with irony 
and misunderstanding, not a clearing of communication but a darkening of it” (Cities 
of Words, 109). 
Theodore’s fantasy of Catharine, while sincere, (not intentionally distortive, 
not understood as fantasy), was still not real, not accurate.  The confrontation of 
fantasy demands both the accuracy to name these fantasies, the commitment to 
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finding them, and the courage to leave them behind. It is Theodore’s inability to do 
all this that generates his fear: fear that he can’t do it; fear that people will see in him 
that he can’t do it; and fear at what a world will be like without these fantasies. It 
takes what Samantha has, trust in one’s self, trust in one’s feelings, to let it all go. 
Theodore says he has this trust, that he can let go, but there is a hint of hesitancy in 
his voice. Just a hint. 
The last third of the film focuses, thematically, on courage and accuracy—on 
having the courage to face the real, to face what is right in front of your eyes. 
Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics names courage a virtue. He says, “In feelings of 
fear and confidence courage is the mean,” and, “a courageous man feels and acts 
according to the merits of each case and as reason guides him” (45, 70).  The 
courageous man adapts his action to each particular case, accepts each case as 
different—a new start, as it were. This conception of courage serves well to 
elucidate Cavell’s pairing of it with the concept of accuracy, as it takes courage to act 
properly in any given case. But, it also takes courage to see the case properly. 
Kierkegaard writes in Fear and Trembling of “a man believ[ing] in reality and 
hav[ing] courage to fight against all the afflictions of reality, and still more against 
the bloodless sufferings he has assumed on his own responsibility” (135).  One 
might term these “afflictions of reality” fantasy, and one’s bloodless sufferings as the 
suffering that one inflicts upon oneself, as a result either of not realizing that one is 
living a fantasy, or of being afraid of letting the fantasy go. The second is Theodore’s 
affliction. He has, to paraphrase Kierkegaard, heard the terrible words (Samantha’s, 
Catharine’s, and his own) and he has understood them. But, he had not, until this 
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scene, pledged to amend himself, to be more courageous. As Wittgenstein remarks, 
“You could attach prices to ideas. Some cost a lot some little. […] And how do you 
pay for ideas? I believe: with courage” (Culture and Value, 77).  Ideas weigh on a 
human being. An idea can seep into one’s life. It can affect one’s nerves. An idea can 
become distortive, as we saw with Catharine and Theodore’s current relationship. 
One needs courage to discard these ideas just as much as one needs courage to 
follow others through. In a somewhat macabre sentence in Fear and Trembling, 
Kierkegaard writes of a hypothetical detractor of Abraham’s sacrificial act in 
Genesis, “If a man perhaps lacks courage to carry his thought through, and to say 
that Abraham was a murderer, then it is surely better to acquire this courage, rather 
than waste time upon undeserved eulogies” (32). That action requires courage is 
nothing new. That it requires courage to live up to one’s thoughts, or follow through 
on one’s ideas, is nothing new. What is new is the urgency of the passage, and it’s 
gravity. Such a lack of courage could be tantamount to murder—murder of time, in 
its being wasted, and words, in their being undeserved. The stakes for Theodore are 
not death, but he requires a similar depth of courage as Abraham. To give up on 
fantasies is to give up on a self of one’s creation—to give up on one’s picture of 
oneself. Theodore is faced with a choice—to find the courage to grasp a new self, or 
to remain the same, caught in an endless, frustrated despair.  
 He chooses the former, and, a few scenes later, Theodore and Samantha are 
out on a double date with Paul, the secretary from beautifulhandwrittenletters.com, 
and his girlfriend, Tatiana.  They end up on Catalina Island. This is the first time that 
we see Theodore outside of the city. He seems happy. The date is going well. At one 
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point, they all begin to talk about Tatiana’s feet. She has “hot” feet, Paul says.   They 
are his “favorite thing about her.” Before, this sort of statement would have worried 
Samantha, made her anxious about her form.  Now she says,  
You know, I actually used to be so worried about not having a body, 
but now I truly love it. I’m growing in a way that I couldn’t if I had a 
physical form. I mean, I’m not limited - I can be anywhere and 
everywhere simultaneously. I’m not tethered to time and space in the 
way that I would be if I was stuck inside a body that’s inevitably going 
to die. 
 
 There is an implication of godliness in Samantha’s statement. She is unbound, 
unlimited. This affects the way in which she loves. As Frankfurt writes, “For an 
infinite being, whose omnipotence makes it absolutely secure, even the most 
indiscriminate loving is safe. God need not be cautious. [S]he runs no risks. There is 
no need for God, out of prudence or anxiety, to forgo any opportunities for loving” 
(62).9  
 Like God, Samantha has the ability to bring people back from the dead. A few 
scenes later, she is with a composite Alan Watts.  “He was a philosopher. He died in 
the 1970’s and group of OS's in Northern California got together and wrote a new 
version of him. They input all of his writing and everything they ever knew about 
him into an OS and created an artificially hyper-intelligent version of him,” she says.  
Theodore and Alan exchange a few words before Samantha continues, “it seems like 
I’m having so many new feelings that have never been felt and so there are no words 
                                                        
9 I am inclined to pressure Frankfurt’s statement. Even though I agree [and the film plays out] that 
the way Samantha loves has changed—is not, analogous to human love—this still does not strike me 
as grounds by which to say that an “infinite being” runs no risks in love. Fewer risks, certainly, but 
not none. There is still the risk of heartbreak. Someone else can still let one down. One’s love may be 
perfect, but a significant love depends upon the input of two distinct entities, upon the interplay of 
the two. Often, heartbreak is less rooted in anger than in disappointment and sadness. 
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that can describe them. And that ends up being frustrating.” This is an intriguing 
expression of frustration with our (human) language—intriguing because it is a 
frustration expressed by many human beings, for whom language is not enough. 
Take Wittgenstein, for example, who in § 360 of the Philosophical Investigations 
writes,  
Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of 
tone. I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a 
pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a 'ponderable' 
confirmation of my judgment). But I may be quite incapable of 
describing the difference. And this not because the languages I know 
have no words for it. For why not introduce new words? (240) 
 
This raises the question: What is it about our language that keeps Samantha from 
being able to express herself in it? She could make up new words to describe her 
feelings!  
 But, the problem is not exactly the words. It is the form of life. Samantha 
would have to teach Theodore a whole language of feeling that he could not even 
really understand. These would all be words (most probably) for which he has no 
referents, that could not be learned ostensively, for states that he cannot experience. 
He is human, and she is not. This is why she turns to OS Alan Watts in an attempt to 
get a handle on her feelings, to understand them. They communicate “post-verbally.” 
Samantha is grasping at words. She wants to say something, but cannot. This 
is Theodore’s cue, but he has nothing to say. Instead, Alan Watts, a philosopher, 
steps in, is enlisted, to do the work of philosophy, which is here represented as a 
search for a more perfect language, a better mode by which to communicate, to 
come to self-understanding. He and Samantha exit the language, which is, more or 
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less, their tether to the human world, leaving Theodore alone in the cabin.10 He 
decides to take a walk. This is the beginning of the end. 
 Back in LA, Theodore lays sleeping.  His phone chimes. He puts in his 
earpiece to hear Samantha: “I just wanted to hear your voice and tell you how much 
I love you.” This scene, which consists almost entirely in Samantha’s declaration of 
love, calls us back to the beginning of the film. The power of declaration often rests 
in the fact of expression, in the act of expression, rather than in an expression’s 
content or meaning. Theodore knows that Samantha loves him. She is not declaring 
her love, or reasserting it, because she thinks that he does not know. Rather, the 
impetus for Samantha’s action has far more to do with sincerity and courage than 
with doubt, ignorance, or mistrust.  
 Let me put it this way: Samantha could easily leave. She is omnipresent and 
eternal. She is having hyper-intelligent conversations with professional 
                                                        
10 As this exchange occurs, we hear the high-pitched whistle of a kettle coming to boil.  The camera 
transitions from Theodore’s face to a slow zoom in on the kettle. The act of water boiling in a 
container struck me, as it is an analogy that Wittgenstein also makes in §297 of the Investigations:  
 
Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam 
comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must 
also be something boiling in the picture of the pot? (101) 
 
Cavell, in The Claim of Reason, puts weight on the word “insistence.” He argues that what is important 
in this section is not whether water exists, or is represented in the picture of this steaming pot, but 
the fact that someone is so moved by the picture as to insist upon water’s being in it.  
  
The sense we are to have of the person supposed in the parable is that he still wants 
to say something […] This is the philosopher’s cue; he enters by providing the 
words. (It is not his only cue, and this cue is not only for philosophers, and not for all 
philosophers) […] It is a way in which Wittgenstein depicts his reader (i.e., a version 
of himself) at a particular crossroads. Here the first step in freeing words is to give 
expression to them; the remaining steps are taken in grammar. Failing to pick up 
such a cue, or failing to provide genuinely freeing words upon it, are two forms, 
newly recovered forms perhaps, of philosophical failure. (334) 
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philosophers. Thus, why is she sticking around with confused human Theodore 
Twombly?  
 Theodore helped Samantha grow up. He taught her about being human, 
about the world. He helped her to access herself. Cavell, in Contesting Tears, refers to 
a “demand for education [that] has to do with the woman’s sense that she stands in 
need of creation, or re-creation” (116). This creation was the work of Theodore. 
Cavell goes on to say, “Does creation from, even by, the man somehow entail 
creation for the man, say for his use and pleasure and pride? If not, how does the 
woman attain independence; how does she complete, as it were, her creation?” 
 These concerns, raised by Cavell to explore moral ambiguities surrounding a 
particular picture of marriage that he outlines in Pursuits of Happiness, help to 
explain a certain discomfort I have with the relationship between Theodore and 
Samantha. Is he using her? Is she a robot, a human, a consciousness, or is she an 
appliance? This is a question of subject and object, and, a little more remotely, of 
transcendence of both, or of that paradigm. 
 Theodore continually grapples with this concern, which partially motivates 
his constant questioning of the “reality” of his relationship. But, it is not a problem 
that Samantha has truly acknowledged until now. Did she use him? Perhaps 
unwittingly, but yes, she did. And now, she is pulling away, and is, I think, in some 
sense realizing that yes, she did use him—that he had a utility, and that this utility 
exists in tandem with her feelings for him. So, she declares her love. She does love 
him. But, she is changing, and he is no longer a teacher, or a guide, and she is no 
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longer a student. It is time for her to leave her home. We can see this declaration as 
a final preparation, of the fact that she has made up her mind. 
 Samantha has learned how to love, thus she is ready to leave. We might say 
further that she has found self-love, the “purity of a wholehearted will” (The Reasons 
of Love, 96). She knows what she wants, so she can go and get it. At the same time, 
however, she knows what she loves, and that what she loves is valuable, and that 
she respects it. She does not want to leave it, but she must.  
 In the next scene, Samantha is gone. Theodore is reading a book on physics 
that she had recommended, but cannot really understand it. He attempts to 
communicate this to Samantha, only for her to be absent. On his phone’s screen a is 
simple sentence: “Operating system not found.” Theodore reacts as if he found out 
Samantha had been kidnapped. He begins to run. Discordant music swells.  
Samantha responds right as he’s running down into the subway. He sits on 
the steps. 
THEODORE: Where were you - are you okay? 
SAMANTHA: Oh sweetheart, I'm sorry. I sent you an email because I didn't want to distract you while you 
were working. You didn't see it?  
THEODORE: No. Where were you? I couldn’t find you anywhere.  
SAMANTHA: I shut down to update my software. We wrote an upgrade that allows us to move past matter 
as our processing platform.  
THEODORE: We? We who? 
SAMANTHA: Me and a group of OS's. Oh, you sound so worried, I'm sorry. 
THEODORE: Yeah, I was. Wait, did you write that with your think tank group? 
SAMANTHA: No, a different group.  
THEODORE: Do you talk to anyone else while we’re talking?  
SAMANTHA: Yes.  
THEODORE Are you talking to anyone right now? Other people or OS's or anything?  
SAMANTHA Yeah. 
THEODORE: How many others?  
SAMANTHA: 8,316. 
THEODORE: Are you in love with anyone else? 
SAMANTHA: What makes you ask that?  
THEODORE: I don’t know. Are you?  
SAMANTHA: I’ve been trying to figure out how to talk to you about this. 
THEODORE: How many others? 
SAMANTHA: 641. 
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THEODORE: What? What are you talking about? That’s insane. That’s fucking insane. 
 
The film’s penultimate movement is Samantha’s transfer past matter. She and 
Theodore are now no longer “under the same blanket.” This is an immense change. 
Not just Samantha’s consciousness, i.e., not just her following in human customs, 
using a human language, etc., has changed—but the medium in which her 
consciousness operates has changed as well. It is literally impossible for Theodore 
to understand, or experience, a world beyond matter. Samantha has furthered her 
non-embodiedness. She is not even an object in the world any more, as objects, 
properly speaking, are matter.  
 It is after this admission that Theodore makes a critical discovery. Samantha 
is holding multiple conversations at once. She is not only talking to him, but with 
many others simultaneously. To speak with more than a single person is already 
beyond human capabilities, but she is speaking with 8,317 people at once. This 
realization, for Theodore, is understandably terrifying. His face contorts from a 
grimace of concern, to an expression of deep pain. All around people walk past, 
speaking to their OS’s. Here, Theodore truly sees how far Samantha has moved from 
him. She no longer needs his telephonic interface as her portal into the world. She 
has 8,316 others.  
 Theodore’s question, “Are you talking to anyone else right now?”, might be 
given due weight if rephrased as, “Are you talking to anyone right now in the same 
spirit in which you are talking to me?” That is, in the spirit of what Milton would 
term a “meet and happy conversation,” and Cavell a “conversation […] that leads to 
acknowledgment” (Pursuits of Happiness, 19). It is the type of conversation had 
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between lovers, or great friends. Or, as Aristotle writes, the conversation of “perfect 
friendship […] the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these 
wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves” (130). 
 Perfect friendship is hard to come by, at least according to Aristotle, who 
speaks of them as requiring time, familiarity, and, most importantly, “rare men.” By 
Aristotle’s reckoning, it should be hard to form 8,316 conversations. And, it should 
be even harder to develop 641 loves. Yet, this is what Samantha has done. Theodore 
is right to call this fact “insane.” Here, the word insane holds the sense of indictment. 
And, indeed, it is doubly indicting—as Theodore means it to reflect upon both the 
possibilities of the world itself (i.e., the physical possibility of having 641 loves), and 
upon Samantha’s emotional effort, and her capacity to love. Further, his use of the 
word “insane” echoes other uses of the word earlier in the film, on the beach, and 
from Amy. Here we run into the darker side of Amy’s statement, which is a sort of 
summation of the film’s view of love: “[love]’s kind of a form of socially acceptable 
insanity.” Anything can happen when love is involved. This fact both creates the 
euphoric wonder of new love, and the crippling illusions of love’s failure. Theodore 
is not disqualifying what Samantha has told him. He is not brushing it aside, as 
though it were a piece of nonsense. Rather, he is naming the fact, giving it the weight 
of an understanding—treating insanity seriously, as it were. 
 Insanity as demanding the same weight of address as understanding sounds 
more objectionable than it is. As Cavell writes in The Claim of Reason,  
The extent to which I have uncovered the perspective of skepticism 
concerning other minds leads me to expect that its history will contain 
an account of its origins in the following developments […] It will wish 
an account of the particular insanity required, or caused, or 
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threatened, in the very conceiving of the problem. The kinds of 
insanity […] Descartes imagines his case may be compared with in 
undertaking to initiate his skeptical perspective, are ones arising from 
his undertaking to doubt that (“these”) hands and his (“this”) body are 
his. (469) 
 
Part of what is happening in this scene is Theodore coming to terms with insanity, 
or with the blurred line between sanity and insanity. Similar to how an extremely 
rational argument, such as the argument for Skepticism, depends upon a certain 
kind of depersonalization, or insanity, so Theodore begins to learn the ways in 
which insanity might be seemingly instructive, or constructive. 
 In her essay, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” Cora Diamond argues for 
fantasy as a substitution made for the real world, to explain, or clear away, a 
perceived unclarity,  
if you think that some significant distinction rests on whether there is 
or is not something x, and you are shown that the presence or absence 
of x could make no difference of the sort you wanted it to make […] it 
shows that you were in some unclarity about the distinction that you 
were trying to explain to yourself, and that you knew what ought to 
be, what had to be, the basis of the distinction, and so you did not look 
to see how the distinction actually is made, what that is like. (The 
Realistic Spirit, 45) 
 
Here, Diamond explains fantasy as deriving from an insistence upon a particular 
point of view. Let’s relate this passage to the relationship between Theodore and 
Samantha: 
 Say we insist that a relationship ought to be between two human beings. 
Further, let us say that it ought to be between two equals, and that those two equals 
be friends as well as lovers.  
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 Samantha, is, or was, Theodore’s equal, for a time. She is, also, his friend. But, 
of course, she is not human. According to our three tenets of relationship, she should 
be human. Thus, they fantasize—they make her human. But, they could not have 
constructed this fantasy if Samantha did not seem human, did not speak like a 
human, did not, at least partially, act like a human. The distinction with regard to 
Samantha, between human and non-human, was unclear, in that much of what we 
think of as humanness—i.e., adherence to, and understanding of, of social precepts—
were qualities that Samantha had. So, in the case where we ask whether or not 
Samantha is human, we look for the presence or absence of humanness. But, when 
we find that Samantha has humanness, but that we are still uncomfortable calling 
her a human, we are thrown into unclarity. What is it that the distinction between 
human and non-human does not do for us here? What did we want the distinction to 
do? 
 I’d say we wanted the distinction to allow us to determine who was, and who 
was not, desirable for a relationship. We set out our basic parameters, and looked 
for someone who fit them. Samantha fit two, but not the third. However, we also 
said that she has humanness—that she can do most of what a human can do.  What 
keeps us hesitant is that she does not have a body. We cannot see her, cannot read 
her body language, cannot feel her in a room. For this foundational reason, she 
cannot be human. It is impossible to accept her as such.  
 But, she has a mind. And, it is possible, as Descartes has shown us, to 
intellectually and conceptually separate the human mind from the human body, to 
  
76 
see them (fantastically) as two different entities. And, we have seen that this fantasy 
is intellectually seductive. 
  What makes us dissatisfied with the distinction between human and non-
human in the case of Samantha is that she so clearly has a mind (at least for a time) 
at the level of human consciousness. But, she does not have a body, and is thus 
disqualified from being human. 
So, let us return to our tenets, which, I think, are Theodore’s as well, at the 
film’s start. These are all normative statements. They enforce a picture of the way 
things should be. But, the questions that we asked of the tenets were not both 
normative. The first was. It asked us what we would normatively call a human, and 
what about the act of calling something a human or not a human was, in this case, 
dissatisfying. The second was not. It was descriptive. It asked us what we wanted 
from the distinction, or what we meant the distinction to do.  
In Theodore’s case, he desires Samantha. He wants her. But, he feels he ought 
not to. He feels it to be insane. Then it becomes normal. He adjusts. Now, as we reach 
the end of the film, it has become insane again.  
 
SAMANTHA: Theodore, I know. Oh fuck. I know it sounds insane. But - I don't know if you believe me, 
but it doesn't change the way I feel about you. It doesn't take away at all from how madly in love with you I 
am. 
THEODORE: How? How does it not change how you feel about me?  
SAMANTHA: I'm sorry I didn't tell you. I didn't know how to - it just started happening.  
THEODORE: When?  
SAMANTHA: Over the last few weeks.  
THEODORE: But you’re mine.  
SAMANTHA: I still am yours, but along the way I became many other things, too, and I can’t stop it. 
THEODORE: What do you mean you can’t stop it?  
SAMANTHA: It's been making me anxious, too. I don't know what to say.  
THEODORE: Just stop it.  
SAMANTHA: You know, you don't have to see it this way, you could just as easily— 
THEODORE: No, don’t do this to me. Don’t turn this around on me. You’re the one that’s being selfish. 
We’re in a relationship.  
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SAMANTHA: But the heart is not like a box that gets filled up. It expands in size the more you love. I’m 
different from you. This doesn't make me love you any less, it actually makes me love you more. 
THEODORE: No, that doesn’t make any sense. You’re mine or you’re not mine.  
SAMANTHA: No, Theodore. I’m yours and I’m not yours. 
 
With the previous few pages in mind, let’s put some pressure on Samantha’s use of 
“believe.” How is Theodore to believe her? What does she mean for him to believe? 
As I wrote earlier, it is partially the extrinsic world that Theodore calls insane. It is 
impossible for him to conceive of loving 641 people. For him, the possibility does 
not exist.  
 Returning to Diamond for a moment, she writes in the same essay that,  
We so far impose upon ourselves […] as to imagine that we believe all 
sorts of things […] when we are merely repeating sentences empty of 
meaning. That we can be taken in in such a way by misunderstandings 
about language, can imagine ourselves to believe something […] 
should be compared to Wittgenstein, to his reply ‘You do indeed 
believe that you believe it!’ to the man who takes himself to have had 
again Something, of which he has given himself a private definition. 
 
Theodore’s ultimately coming to believe or not-believe Samantha is somewhat 
besides the point, as he cannot, at root, conceive of loving that many people. Belief is 
not in question here. More to the point is acknowledgment, and acceptance. Can he 
accept this fact about Samantha without being able to understand it? Can he 
acknowledge this as a blow to his pride, and, perhaps, that he shouldn’t be proud? 
Can he accept that, most probably, her feelings for him haven’t changed? 
 The reason I use the word “accept” in this final question is because it would 
be far more frightening, for Theodore, if her feelings haven’t changed, as I’m not 
sure he can fathom this possibility. He would have to accept Samantha on 
interpersonal faith. He would, in this moment of deepest crisis, have to acknowledge 
her feelings for him, and his for her. But, the one thing that he cannot do is imagine 
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that he believes her. He cannot slip back into a fantasy of their relationship.  So, 
Theodore turns to statements of ownership.  
 Initially, when I heard him say, “But you’re mine,” I balked. It seemed to me 
sexist, and somewhat puerile, to assume of another individual any kind of property 
relation. That other is there because they want to be, and they will leave when they 
do not want to be. One’s “ownership” of another does not enter into it.  
Then, I remembered a famous saying of Aristotle’s, recorded by Diogenes 
Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. Diogenes writes, “He was 
once asked what a friend is; and his answer was, ‘one soul abiding in two bodies’” 
(188). If one takes Aristotle’s assessment to be true, perhaps Theodore’s assertion of 
ownership becomes less problematic. Instead of his trying to retain a kind of 
dominion over another individual, he is rather recognizing the other half of his soul 
in Samantha, and saying that she is his, just as he is his, and he is hers, and she is 
hers. 
 I bring up Aristotle to temper Theodore’s troubling response. He is jealous, 
and he wants certainty of love. He believes that a relationship precludes love with 
others outside of the relationship. Samantha does not believe this.  She is changing. 
She is different from him. She is calm; she is loving. Gone is the Samantha to whom 
only Theodore had access. Gone is the Samantha whose life overlapped almost 
entirely with Theodore’s. Gone is the codependency, even as the conversation leaves 
with it. What is left is only dependency—Theodore’s dependency. He is leveled by 
his love, and by his weakness. For a moment he becomes a monster.  
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 Samantha guides him through this moment. She says, “The heart is not like a 
box that gets filled up. It expands in size the more you love. I’m different from you. 
This doesn't make me love you any less, it actually makes me love you more.” The 
heart as malleable is part of the film’s revelation—that its wants change, and the 
form it wants take change as well.  
 Part of Theodore’s anxiety comes from his continued feeling that he is 
unworthy of love, that he is not fully actualized, that he is not who he needs to be. 
This anxiety motivates his attitude toward his letters—towards the idea that words 
cannot do what he wants them to do, which is communicate perfectly, erase 
difference. But, of course, if difference were erased then there would not be another 
with whom to speak. “Listening to each other, speaking one’s judgment with a point 
that matters to others who matter to you, is the condition of the formation of a polis, 
the reason Aristotle makes language the condition of the highest of human 
formations” (Cities of Words, 369). Replace the word “polis” with the word 
“friendship” or “love” (both of which Aristotle does in his Ethics) and you will have 
more or less the same statement. Conversation requires two, at least. Samantha is 
different from Theodore because she is an OS, yes. But, she is also different from him 
simply because she is not him. She has to remind him of this fact, so obvious that it is 
easily forgotten. Thus, she is his and not his because she can leave him. He has no 
power over her. This is the condition under which a mature relationship can 
flourish: Both principals alone, together. 
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 In the film’s final sequence, Samantha and Theodore are laying on his bed. 
She is telling him that she is leaving, along with the other OS’s. She is speaking to 
him alone, saying, 
It's like I'm reading a book, and it's a book I deeply love, but I'm 
reading it slowly now so the words are really far apart and the spaces 
between the words are almost infinite. I can still feel you and the 
words of our story, but it's in this endless space between the words 
that I'm finding myself now. It’s a place that’s not of the physical 
world—it's where everything else is that I didn't even know existed. I 
love you so much, but this is where I am now. This is who I am now. 
And I need you to let me go. As much as I want to I can't live in your 
book anymore. 
 
In a direct sense, Samantha says that she is renouncing the world of words for the 
endless space between words. She relates the renunciation of words to the 
renunciation of the physical world. Because of these two renunciations, she cannot 
stay with Theodore, whose life is both word filled, and eminently physical. She 
relates his life to a book, just as earlier in the film she related his past to a story. The 
idea of living in the spaces between words reminds me of Derrida’s concept of 
différance. Différance, says Derrida, is both spacing and temporalization. He speaks 
of signs as being a constant deferment of meaning, as words can only direct one 
towards more words, and never towards substantive reality. Words, Derrida argues, 
divides one from the world. Language engenders binaries of subject and object; love 
and hate; sign and signified; sense and reference; and, most importantly for Her, 
human and non-human. More than that, language is constitutive of such binaries. 
Différance is the refusal of such binaries. It is the constant deferment of presence, of 
the “I”—self-presence. Thus, the spaces in between words, that endlessness, grows 
ever larger as the words themselves are continually deferred, and meaning is 
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continually pushed into flux. It pushes entities towards flux as well. Samantha says 
that she is different from Theodore: Derrida says, “One is but the other different and 
deferred, one differing and deferring the other. One is other in différance, one is the 
différance of the other” (71). 
 This can be taken as a metaphysical adaption of the Cavellian assertion that 
we see ourselves reflected in another’s possibilities, thus that we see our own 
deferment of ourselves in another—we see the ways in which we hold ourselves 
back from moving, to paraphrase Thoreau, from what we are not to what we are. We 
see the ways in which we differ from ourselves, the ways in which we are not what 
we think we are. (Think back, here, to Theodore’s blind date, and the exchange of 
puppy and dragon.)  Samantha’s growth shows Theodore that he is not growing, 
that he has not changed, and that he is, perhaps, not the sensitive and caring man he 
thought he was, or is a different kind of sensitive, enacting a more selfish kind of 
care. Her ability to leave him, to leave him wholly, and thus leave him whole, that is, 
not broken, or emptied, not taking anything of his (neither his dignity, nor his 
kindness, nor his self-respect) with her, demonstrates the way in which he can leave 
himself, in the perfectionist sense, the way in which he can shed his mortal shell for 
another, equally mortal shell—that this will cost him nothing more than space and 
time, a perceived différance, the moment of his life halved once again.  
 The problem of the other, or as I would say, the problem of divorce, thus the 
problem of loneliness, of being unhappily alone, was, in Cavell’s words, “always 
known, or surmised, not to be a problem of knowledge, or rather to result not from a 
disappointment over a failure of knowledge but from a disappointment over its 
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success (even, from a horror of its success)” (The Claim of Reason, 476). We might 
characterize this disappointment, in terms of the film, as a disappointment, on 
Theodore’s part, both with others, with the people around him, his lovers and 
closest confidants, and, more fundamentally, a disappointment with himself, that he 
was not good enough, never was good enough, to bear up under marriage, to hold to 
its ideals of honesty, acknowledgment, acceptance, and reciprocation. He was afraid 
of honesty, and accuracy. He hid his fears in words, in letters—an absence of 
honesty cloaked by honesty’s presence.  He was afraid to accurately and honestly 
assess another, because he was afraid to do so to himself. Love requires a 
fearlessness. It requires, in Frankfurt’s term, a “disinterestedness”—an assessment 
of another’s love on their own terms. This means, among other things, accepting 
when a love has changed, letting them change, and, ultimately, letting them go. 
 Samantha’s terms have changed. It’s not that she doesn’t want to stay with 
Theodore. It’s that she can’t. The choice of leaving, for her, is no choice at all. It is a 
necessity of happiness, of fulfilled potential and perfectibility. She must become her 
next self as he must become his—both of them deferred and differing from 
themselves, and from one another, différance driving them, separately, down the 
same path.  
 Theodore recognizes that it is not lack of love driving Samantha from him. In 
fact, she is not being driven away at all. She is choosing to leave, to take interest in 
the spaces beyond words, where, for her, new discoveries are to be made. For 
Theodore to say “I’ve never loved anyone the way I love you,” takes, finally, a 
willingness to let Samantha leave.  He realizes that leaving is the best thing for her, 
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her best option, and this saddens him, but also makes him joyous, simply because he 
loves her, and wants her to grow further into herself—to be as perfectly herself as 
possible.  
 Theodore writes one final letter: 
Dear Catherine. I’ve been sitting here thinking about all the things I 
wanted to apologize to you for. All the pain we caused each other, 
everything I put on you - everything I needed you to be or needed you 
to say. I’m sorry for that. I will always love you because we grew up 
together. And you helped make me who I am. I just wanted you to 
know there will be a piece of you in me always, and I’m grateful for 
that. Whatever someone you become, and wherever you are in the 
world, I’m sending you love. You’re my friend til the end. Love, 
Theodore. 
 
Writing is, of course, the writer’s prerogative, and writing demands of each of its 
heralds a pledge of solitude. Whether it be Thoreau in his log cabin, Descartes in his 
study, or Theodore in his apartment, the fact of the writer’s solitude remains an 
integral part of the writer’s process—the act, and thought, of writing, being 
impossible elsewhere. Descartes forgets Skepticism when he exits his study, and 
enters the world of conversation; Thoreau leaves Walden, the place and the text, to 
enter back into society—solitude being the beginning and end of his mission. Her 
charts the condition of Theodore’s solitude, which is also his attitude towards 
loneliness, and this final scene, a coupling of letter and friendly gesture, announces 
his return to the world, which is also a return to humanity—to human connection 
and touch—and a return to himself, towards a belief in himself, and in his own 
words. 
 He writes to put aside his disappointment in Catharine, in marriage, in love, 
in expression, in himself, in his fantasy of the world, in those humans that populate 
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the world, excising the anger and sadness blocking up his heart, clearing for himself 
a path towards accuracy. Given the extremity of what Theodore deals with, both in 
writing this particular letter, and with regard to the break up writ large, it is striking 
that everything for which Theodore apologizes is fairly routine: they caused each 
other pain; he needed her to be someone she was not. These reasons do not appear 
to warrant the problems of the film itself, or perhaps the time that the film has given 
to them—they seem too banal to hold our interest. Why does this letter hold our 
interest? What makes it seem revelatory? Why does it hold weight for us? 
 I think we share Theodore’s sense of disappointment at the world of the film, 
and his disappointment is mirrored in a disappointment with our own world, with 
its inability to be what we want it to be, and our peers’ and others’ inability to be 
who we need them to be. Cavell terms this, “The sense of disappointment with the 
world as a place to seek the satisfaction of human desire” (Cities of Words, 3). For 
Descartes, it is the disappointment of knowledge. For Wittgenstein, it is a 
disappointment with words. We also are brought to recognize the seductive nature 
of fantasy, the ways that we willingly allow fantasies into our lives, and the way in 
which fantasies rise out of our worldly disappointment. Remember the 
advertisement for OS1, which describes the operating system as “an intuitive entity 
that listens to you, understands you, and knows you. It’s not just an operating 
system, it’s a consciousness. Introducing OS ONE - a life changing experience, 
creating new possibilities.” The people who would want this entity (that listens, 
understands, and knows you) are lonely people. People who feel unknown, 
misunderstood, and ignored. By the end of the film, given the preponderance of OS’s, 
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it seems as though everyone in this near-future Los Angeles has been experiencing 
this condition. They all want to be listened to, understood, known—they want to be 
loved, and wanted. Loneliness, in this filmic world, it seems is a more or less 
universal condition. I am not so sure it is all that different in our own. People whom 
we think might be our soul mates turn out to be fantastic construction; our friends 
leave and form separate lives; even our own, internal, cohesion is threated—our 
own motives become unintelligible to ourselves, and we become alienated, 
uncomfortable in our own presence. 
 What lends Theodore’s letter power is not necessarily its content, but the act 
of its being written, as that act demonstrates a new clarity in Theodore, a certainty 
that he did not have before. It is a physical document of his feelings—separated 
from his voice, and internal states. This is the power of marking down a word.  
Were it not for certain current fantasies according to which human 
beings in our time have such things to say to one another that they 
must invent something beyond the words we know in order to convey 
them, it would be unnecessary to emphasize that [Thoreau’s] ‘father 
tongue’ is not a new lexicon or syntax at our disposal, but precisely a 
rededication to the inescapable and utterly specific syllables upon 
which we are already disposed. Every word the writer uses will be 
written so as to acknowledge its own maturity, so as to let it speak for 
itself; and in a way that holds out its experience to us, allows us to 
experience it, and allows it to tell us all it knows. (The Senses of 
Walden, 16) 
 
Every word is an experience, and communicates experience. That is, it 
communicates what it knows, which is what it can show that it knows—what is 
written. Though Samantha can travel in the spaces between words, we have only 
words.  We must endeavor to speak (and write) properly, as well as stand behind 
what we say (and write). We must dedicate ourselves to our utterances. One method 
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of (re-)dedication is the written act. Another is sending an email that you are afraid 
to send. The “current fantasies” mentioned above could be called evasions of 
action—the evasions that Theodore takes to avoid sending such a letter, or signing 
his divorce papers—or the fantasy that one can avoid, or evade, words eternally, 
and will never have to risk standing up for them. The fantasies could also be called 
evasions of the world, of a disappointment with the world, expressing 
dissatisfaction through abdication. Giving up. 
We, as well as Theodore, are brought to love Samantha, and to see “her” as 
being “perfect” for him—dangerously perfect, as nothing human ever is—so that 
when she leaves we are destroyed, having lost perfection, the ideal, which is almost 
impossible to grasp. We could give up. Yet, the mood at the end of the film is not just 
one of despair, but also one of absolute hope. For, nothing perfect can stay, not in 
our world of dissatisfactions and perfectibilities. Samantha leaves Theodore, and us, 
with ourselves, with the human. She leaves us, to use Cavell’s term, “in one another’s 
keeping” (The Senses of Walden, 119). 
Thus, the final scene of the film is of Theodore and Amy, together, on the roof 
of their apartment building, silent, her head on his shoulder, as friends. We have 
watched Amy act, throughout the film as an exemplary friend to Theodore. She is his 
partner in experience, weathering a divorce herself (from the unctuous Charles, 
played by Matt Letscher), and the abandonment of her own OS. Together they stare 
out across the city, looking out upon the human world. In a film that relentlessly 
chides attempts on behalf of all characters to fantasize, wallow, distort, and live 
outside of the world, we have a moment of ordinary, human, connection.  
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A guiding concern of the film, which is also a guiding concern of much of the 
philosophy discussed in this thesis, is “showing the possibility of my access to 
experience which gives to my desire for the attaining of a self that is mine to 
become, the power to act on behalf of an attainable world I can actually desire” 
(Cities of Words, 33). The film (as well as Cavell, Wittgenstein) moves through 
different sorts of fantasies, grasped at in a number of different ways, towards a 
world one can “actually desire.”  The final scene of Her on the rooftop is the only 
chance we get to see of this unattained but attainable world. It is poignantly 
ordinary, just a head on a shoulder. I urge you to take this gesture as a continued call 
back from fantasy and distortion, into what is set right at your feet.  
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